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Equity in health care financing and progress towards universal health coverage 
(UHC) have increasingly received recognition and growing attention for their 
potential to improve health outcomes globally. However, most low income countries 
and in particular those in sub-Saharan Africa which have borne the greater share of 
global disease burden have had relatively lesser success in their endeavours to 
improve their health care financing systems. It is only a few that have made 
considerable progress towards universal health coverage. Zambia, a developing 
country struggling with income inequalities and poor progress to achieving universal 
health coverage, is no exception.  
The current discussion on countries moving toward universal health coverage, 
however, requires an understanding of the impact of the prevailing health care 
financing mechanisms on income distribution. Investigation of an overall income 
redistributive effect of health care financing thus requires assessing health care 
financing in relation to the principles of contributing to financing health care 
according to ability to pay.  
Zambia is currently considering major health systems reforms toward a universal 
health system. Health care financing system in Zambia is however faced with 
numerous challenges that must be addressed prior to meeting this goal. To promote 
the goal of achieving universal health coverage, there is a need to measure the 
extent of the redistributive effect of the current health care financing mechanisms. 
This allows identifying which health care financing mechanisms provide financial 




With this growing focus on the goal of universal health coverage (UHC), health care 
financing mechanisms should not only relate to who pays and who receives the 
benefit, but also to their effects on income distribution. This is because financing of 
health care may have redistributive effects and equity consequences. This income 
redistribution may be intended or unintended. Even in the latter case, policy makers 
may be interested in the degree to which it occurs.  This is because it has 
consequences for the distribution of goods and services other than health care and, 
ultimately, for welfare.  
This study investigates the extent to which the current health care financing in 
Zambia redistributes income, particularly whether or not it reduces income inequality. 
The study seeks to evaluate an overall pattern of income redistributive effect of the 
current health care financing mechanisms. It specifically assesses the income 
redistributive effect of two broad health care financing mechanisms; general tax and 
out of pocket (OOP) payments. Using a standard procedure for analyzing income 
redistribution of health care financing in Zambia, the study decomposes the income 
redistributive effect of each of the two broad health care financing mechanisms into 
the vertical, horizontal and reranking components.  
The study draws on secondary data from the 2010 Zambia Living Condition 
Monitoring Survey (LCMS), which is a national representative household survey with 
a sample size of 19,397 households. Data collected by Living Condition Monitoring 
Survey relate to all aspects of household decision making and well-being. It also 





In order to compute the incidence of different health care financing mechanisms, the 
construction of the household consumption expenditure was based on the household 
reported expenditure and consumption of food (frequently purchased), housing and 
other non-food items (less frequently purchased). The measure also takes into 
account consumption from other sources than purchases from the market. This 
means that consumption of own production, transfers received in kind from any 
source and wage payments, imputed rents from owner occupied housing unit were 
all considered in measuring the household consumption expenditure. Per capita 
income was computed based on total household consumption expenditure by 
dividing the total household income by the household size. 
The study reports an overall pro poor income redistribution (reduces income 
inequality) with health care financing in Zambia. The findings show that direct taxes 
in form of personal income tax and corporate income tax are progressive health care 
financing mechanisms and with pro-rich income redistribution (increase income 
inequality). Unlike direct taxes, indirect taxes in form of value added tax, fuel levy 
and excise taxes were found to lead to pro poor income redistribution (reduce 
income inequality) and as such they favour the poor relative to the rich. General 
taxes were found to be progressive and induce pro-rich income redistribution. Out of 
pocket payments were also found to induce pro-rich income redistribution in Zambia.  
In all cases, except for the overall health care financing and indirect taxes the 
combined effect of the horizontal and reranking effects dominate the vertical effect. 
The results presented in this study have provided some interesting and useful 
information upon which a number of recommendations for reforming the Zambian 
health care financing system can be based.  It provides valuable insights as the 




health care financing. It can also be used as a clear policy tool for reducing income 
inequality in Zambia and in other countries, especially in Africa that are battling with 
a high level of income inequality. Therefore, for Zambia to attain universal health 
coverage, the country needs to have a health care financing system that ameliorates 
income inequalities in the country by promoting equitable and pro poor financing 
mechanisms. In addition, the funding pool for the health care needs to grow and this 
can be achieved by improving the efficiency of tax collection and increasing the 
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1.  Introduction 
Currently, equity in health care financing and universal health coverage dominates 
policy debates worldwide. Health care financing arrangements are therefore central 
to universal health coverage. However, the way funds are collected, pooled, and 
used to purchase or provide services should  be carefully considered to ensure that 
population needs are addressed under a universal health system (Chuma, J., &  
Okungu, V. 2011). Although public finance system has been rightly praised for their 
attention to the financing and provision of services, recent studies, however, show 
that they have not been able to deal adequately with issues involving equity in health 
care financing and delivery. It has  demonstrated that payments for and financing of 
health care services can be associated with multiple adverse effects on household 
living standard, thereby threatening their income sufficiency, disrupt their positions in 
the socioeconomic hierarchy and therefore exacerbate overall inequalities in the 
distribution of income (van Doorslaer et al., 2007; van Doorslaer et al., 1999). 
In addressing this, World Health Assembly, in its sixty fourth reports has however re-
emphasized the valuable contribution made by fair and sustainable financing 
structures, to the achievement of the health-related Millennium Development Goals. 
The report has specified three principles for equitable financing. First is financial risk 
protection where no one in need of health services ought not to be denied access 
due to inability to pay and households' livelihoods should not be threatened by the 
costs of care. The second principle is progressive financing implying that 
contributions be made according to ability to pay (ATP), and the third principle is 




(WHR,2000; Zikusooka et al., 2009). This global call has seen some developing 
countries  in Africa such as Ghana and Tanzania  implementing health financing 
reforms (National Health Insurance) in line with universal health coverage (Mills et 
al., 2012) while Zambia has not yet. Recently, however, Zambia has shown 
commitment to the implementation of health financing reforms like the National 
Health Insurance (Ministry of Health, 2011). It is expected that national health 
insurance will contribute toward redressing existing inequalities in the country. 
While, the Government of the republic of Zambia is committed to improving equity in 
access to needed health care and providing financial risk protection through the 
implementation of health care financing reforms aimed at achieving universal health 
coverage, there is need to examine the extent to which the existing financing 
mechanisms are equitable. This will therefore provide research outputs that would 
feed into an evidence based policy formulation. Indeed, equity in health care is 
enshrined in Ministry of Health stated vision to bring health services as close to the 
family as possible (Ministry of Health, 2011). Nevertheless, in the absence of health 
financing mechanisms that promote financial risk protection and equity, and what this 
strategy will be, is still to be defined. Yet, it is very likely that the government will 
adopt some form of strategy towards universal health coverage at a certain stage. 
There is no doubt, these financing reforms are designed to “provide the people of 
Zambia with equity of access to cost-effective, quality healthcare as close to the 
family as possible.” These aims were originally stated in the National Health Policies 
and Strategies of 1992 and were reaffirmed in the 2006-2010 National Health 
Strategic Plan (Ministry of Health., 2005; World Bank., 2012).  
Since 2005, the Zambian economy has continued to register positive real Gross 




to World Bank (2012) the Gross National Income (GNI) is around $1,350 per capita 
but the distribution is unequal. For instance, in 2010, the poorest 50 per cent of the 
household accounted for 9.1 per cent of the total income, while the richest 10 per 
cent accounted for 52.6 per cent of the income (CSO, 2010). Much of this economic 
growth was observed during the implementation of the Fifth National Development 
Plan (FNDP), which covered the period 2006 and 2010. Despite this economic 
growth, there has been no notable corresponding improvement in the wellbeing of 
the people, especially in rural areas. The rate of poverty (i.e. the percentage of the 
population living below the national poverty line as defined by the World Bank) 
declined significantly over the last few years but still stands at 60.5 percent (CSO, 
2010). 
One of the major challenges facing Zambia today is to reduce poverty and economic 
inequality among the population. Despite the recent turnaround in the economy as 
shown by real GDP growth of more than 5 per cent, the majority of Zambians 
continue to live in poverty. Rural poverty is estimated at 77.9% compared with urban 
poverty which stood at 27.5% (CSO, 2012). These high poverty levels also have 
implication on the ability to contribute to social health insurance scheme (MoH, 
2012).  
Over the past decades, however, major methodological advancements in the 
measurement of income inequality and progressivity have emerged, and there has 
been a huge empirical interest in evaluating how health care financing arrangements 
affect income distribution. And one of the most often used measures of income 
redistribution is the redistributive effect (RE) which is equal to a difference between 
Gini coefficients of pre and post income payment. However, the view that the health 




widespread support, particularly in the OECD countries (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 
2000) and relatively new in developing countries. Initially, Wagstaff et al. (1989) 
quantified progressivity (or regressivity) of health system financing using Kakwani’s 
index (Kakwani, 1977). Later, Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (1997) gained further 
insight by applying the Aronson et al, (1994) decomposition method, which makes it 
possible to decompose the change in income inequality caused by financing into a 
vertical, horizontal and reranking effect; each effect corresponding to a different 
dimension of equity. Health care financing should however not be linked to 
utilization, and the distribution of household contributions has to be seen as an 
independent policy choice and consequences of which should also be examined 
separately. It is therefore of primary interest to measure to what extent and how 
financing is related to household ability to pay (ATP). 
As Zambia plans to move toward universal health coverage, empirical evidence is 
therefore required on the distribution of the burden of the existing health care 
financing mechanisms. This provides the impetus for the study to assess equity in 
health care financing and its impact on income distribution across social economic 
status.  Thus, this study assesses the financial incidences of various mechanisms of 
health care finance and their income distribution in Zambia. The study provides an 
overall pattern of income redistributive effect of the current health care financing 
mechanisms. It specifically assesses the income redistribution effect of two broad 
health care financing mechanisms—general tax and out of pocket (OOP) payments. 
Therefore, the study decomposes the redistributive effect of each of the two broad 
health care financing mechanisms into the vertical component, horizontal component 





1.1 Zambia: State of the economy, general demographic and health indicators 
1.1.1 Demographic indicators 
Zambia is a landlocked country in the southern region of Africa. It covers 
approximately 752,612 km2  (ZDHS, 2007) and is surrounded by 8 other countries, 
namely; Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Botswana, 
Namibia, Mozambique and Angola. The country’s terrain mostly consists of high 
plateaus. However, the country has several hydrographic bodies, such as lakes and 
rivers. According to the Central Statistical Office (2010) estimates for 2010, the 
country has a population of approximately 13 million. The majority of the population 
(65 percent) lives in rural areas and is dependent on subsistence agriculture for its 
livelihood.  
Zambia’s economy is highly dependent on the trade activities in Lusaka and the 
Copperbelt, thus, majority of the population resides in and around these two major 
financial centers. Administratively, the country is divided into 9 provinces and 74 
districts (CSO, 2010). However, during the years 2011 and 2012, twenty one ( 21) 
new more districts and one province have been created by the current Patriotic Front 
(PF) government making a total of 10 provinces and 103 districts. Out of the 10 
provinces, Lusaka and Copperbelt provinces are predominantly urban, while the rest 
are predominantly rural.  
1.1.2 Economic indicators 
Despite having attained its political independence 49 years ago and enjoying relative 
peace and political stability, Zambia is said to be a ‘developing country’ and 
classified as a lower middle income country. The state of the economy is mixed in 
nature with liberal policies skewed towards private and foreign investments. Since 




transforming it into a prosperous middle-income nation by 2030. This vision is being 
implemented through successive 5 year National Development Plans (NDPs). 
Currently, the country is implementing the Sixth National development Plan (SNDP), 
which outlines the country’s overall socio-economic development agenda for the next 
5 years ending in 2015.  
In addition, the country has embarked on the Private Sector Development 
Programme (PSDP), which is meant to attract both domestic and foreign investment 
in the various sectors of the economy such as health. This is to be achieved through 
Zambia’s broad macroeconomic and social policies, which include pro-poor 
economic growth, low inflation, stable exchange rates and financial stability (CSO, 
2010). However, Zambia’s main export is copper, accounting for over 70 percent of 
the country’s export earnings. Over the past 5 years, the country has registered 
consistent economic growth, averaging 6.2 percent in 2011, 7.3 percent in 2012, and 
significant improvements in other key macro-economic indicators (Ministry of Health, 
2011; World Bank, 2012; Ministry of Finance, 2013). Notably, inflation declined from 
35.2 percent at the end of 1996 to 7.9 percent at the end of 2010 (CSO, 2010) while 
lending rates had fallen from an average of 20 percent in 2012 to 16.3 percent as at 
June 2013(Ministry of Finance, 2013). 
Although the country has registered economic growth, these achievements have not 
yet significantly impacted on the socioeconomic status of the majority of the 
population, who have continued to face poverty and socio-economic deprivation. 
Income inequality remained high with the Gini Coefficient estimated at 0.57(World 
Bank., 2012) and overall poverty level at 67percent (ZDHS, 2007; Ministry of Health, 
2011). However, recent studies by the Central Statistical Office (CSO) on Living and 




proportion of the population living below the poverty line from 62.8 percent in 2006 to 
60.5 percent in 2010. But when compared between rural and urban, the rural 
population of Zambia remained predominantly poor with poverty levels at 77.9 
percent as compared to their urban counterparts at 27.5 percent (CSO, 2010).  
1.1.3 Health indicators 
With regard to health indicators, Zambia has a high disease burden which is largely 
influenced by the high prevalence and impact of communicable diseases, particularly 
malaria, HIV and AIDS, Tuberculosis (TB) and Sexually Transmitted Infections 
(Ministry of Health, 2010). The country is also faced with a high burden of Maternal, 
Neonatal and Child Health (MNCH) problems, and a growing problem of Non-
Communicable Diseases (NCDs), including mental health, cancers, sickle cell 
anaemia, diabetes mellitus, hypertension and heart diseases, chronic respiratory 
disease, blindness and eye refractive defects, and oral health problems (Ministry of 
Health, 2011). This high disease burden coupled with a growing population has 
contributed to the expanded demand for health services in Zambia. The rapid 
population growth places an increasing burden on the national economy, particularly 
the capacity of the health system to keep pace with the health needs of a rapidly 
increasing population.   
In the recent past, however, the health sector recorded significant progress in most 
of the key areas of health service delivery, leading to major improvements in most of 
the key health performance indicators during the period 2002 and 2007. The highest 
improvement being recorded in malaria incidence which reduced by 40 percent. It 
should, however, be noted that these figures, despite the reductions recorded, are 
still high when compared to other countries in the world or in the region (Ministry of 




Progress Report, for example, shows that Zambia is making progress, but not fast 
enough to meet the targets. The under-five mortality rate is currently 119 deaths per 
1,000 live births, down from 191 per 1,000 in 1992, but still far from the 2015 target 
of 56 per 1,000. Progress on maternal health has been similar and the mortality rate 
has decreased from 649 deaths per 100,000 births in 1996 to 449 per 100,000 in 
2007. This is three times higher than the 2015 target of 163 (Pereira, 2009). 
1.2  Health care financing system in Zambia 
According to Ministry of health (2012), the health care system in Zambia is financed 
through a mix of various sources of financing mechanisms (e.g. general tax, out of 
pocket (OOP), donors and private insurance contributions). The main health care 
financing sources in Zambia are government, households and donors. However, the 
public funding dominates other health care financing mechanisms (MoH, 2010) as 
shown in figure1.  
Figure 1: Distribution of real health financing expenditure sources (ZMK’ billion) 
 
Source: Ministry of Health; 2007-2010 NHA survey data 
 
But government allocation to the health sector, calculated as a percentage of total 
the national budget stands at 8.5%, which is below the Abuja target of 15%. As a 




between 5.4% and 6.6%, which translate to approximately US$ 28 per capita (NHSP 
2011-2015).  
Other sources of health care financing include user fees which, until the introduction 
of the User Fees Removal Policy for rural and peri-urban areas in 2006, represented 
about 4% of total health care financing. Even with the abolition of user fees, they 
continue to be a source of flexible financing for major hospitals like the University 
Teaching Hospital (UTH), Ndola and Kitwe Central Hospitals (MoH, 2012). 
Government also collects an earmarked 1% tax on interest earnings which 
contributes about ZMK8 billion to the Health Sector basket annually (MoH, 2012).  
Private expenditure on health as a percentage of total health expenditure in 2010 on 
the other hand accounts for 67 percent of the total health expenditure. 24 percent 
was generated through general taxation while 2.3 percent of the total health 
expenditure was from private health insurance schemes (Masiye, Chitah & McIntyre, 
2010; WHO, 2010).  OOP payment as a percentage of total health expenditure was 
27 percent (World Bank 2012; WHO, 2010).  In a multi-country analysis undertaken 
by Leive and Xu ( 2008) to assess how households cope with OOP payments in 15 
countries, Zambia was one of the countries with the highest prevalence of these out 
of pocket payments; ranking higher than some African countries like Malawi. Picazo 
and Zhao (2009) on the other hand reported that total health care spending as a 
percentage of GDP was 6 percent which translated to approximately US$ 28 per 
capita. As a percentage of total health expenditure, government spending were 37 
percent in 1995, 28 percent in 2000, 57 percent in 2004, whereas private prepaid 
spending as a percentage of total expenditure on health were 17 percent, 4.2 
percent, 4.3 percent in 1995, 2000 and 2004. Nevertheless, estimates of government 




This may however be ascribed to the amount of donor funding in particular years, 
whether it was regarded as part of government health expenditure or not. Therefore, 
assessment of health care expenditures estimates in Zambia reveals that 
government expenditure as a share appeared to differ depending on whether donor 
funds were budget support or project support. This may therefore weaken the 
general taxes because external funding can be unpredictable or project specific. 
1.3   Health care provision in Zambia 
Zambia has a two tier medical system with considerable overlap. Approximately 2.3 
percent (WHO,2010) of the population is covered by private medical insurance and 
makes use of modern, generally well-resourced, private sector facilities while over 80 
percent (MoH/NHSP 2011 -2015) of the population depends on the state sponsored 
health-care of which the quality is quite variable according to geographical areas. A 
small but significant part of the population will access primary care in the private 
sector but will use the public sector for hospitalisation and specialised services. 
The health sector in Zambia is liberalised and embraces diversity in ownership, 
though the Ministry of Health is responsible for the overall coordination and 
management of secondary level and tertiary health facilities, while Ministry of 
Community Development, Mother and Child Health (MCDMCH) is now responsible 
for overall coordination and management of all the health facilities providing primary 
health care such as district hospitals and health post (GRZ, 2012).  
Despite a dual health care system with both public and private health services co-
existing in Zambia, the government provides health care services which are heavily 
subsidised to the population through public health facilities throughout the country 




the Ministry of Community Development, Mother and Child Health that provide 
primary, secondary and tertiary health care throughout various types of health 
facilities (such as health centres, district hospitals, general hospitals, central and 
tertiary hospitals).  
Private providers also complement the health services provided by the government, 
though they mainly focus on curative services (MoH/NHSP, 2011-2015).  Therefore, 
by ownership, the Zambian health sector can be divided into: public health sector, 
which includes health facilities and programmes under the Ministry of Health, the 
Ministry of Community Development Mother and Child Health, and some 
government line ministries and departments like Military hospitals; faith-based health 
sector, under the coordination of the Churches Health Association of Zambia 
(CHAZ); the private sector, including for-profit health services, owned by private 
investors, and the traditional (alternative) health sector, which however operates 
informally and not regulated or monitored by the Ministry of Health (MoH/NHSP, 
2011-2015).  
Zambia’s health care system is also organized around a referral flow system that has 
the same structure as the overall administrative system in the country, delivering 
health services through several health posts, health centres, and at least one district 
hospital in each of Zambia’s 103 districts1 at the first level (or district/primary) of 
referral, one second-level (or provincial/secondary) hospital (commonly referred to 
as a general hospital) in each of the ten provinces and four central hospitals (i.e. 
University Teaching Hospital, Ndola Central Hospital and Kitwe Central Hospital, and 
Chainama Mental Hospital) in the whole country that function as third-level (or 




The services provided at each level of care are however defined by the Basic Health 
Care Package recommended by the Health Professions Council of Zambia (HPCZ) 
in the Health Professions Act of 2009, formally known as the Medical Council of 
Zambia (MCZ).  According to Nachuk and Kundra (2008) and Ministry of Health 
(2006), these health facilities are differentiated in terms of coverage as follows:  
Health posts are intended to cater to populations of 500 households (3,500 people) 
in rural areas and 1,000 households (7,000 people) in the urban areas, or to be 
established within a five-kilometre radius in sparsely populated areas.  
Health centres include Urban Health Centres, which are intended to serve a 
population of 30,000 to 50,000 people, and Rural Health Centres, serving a 
catchment area within a 29-kilometer radius or population of 10,000.  
First-level referral hospitals are found in most of the 103 districts1 of Zambia and 
are intended to serve a population of between 80,000 and 200,000 with medical, 
surgical, obstetric, and diagnostic services, including all clinical services to support 
health centre referrals.   
General hospitals are second-level hospitals at the provincial level and are 
intended to cater to a catchment area of 200,000 to 800,000 people, with services in 
internal medicine, general surgery, paediatrics, obstetrics and gynaecology, dental, 
psychiatry, and intensive care. These hospitals are also intended to act as referral 
centres for the first-level institutions, including the provision of technical backup and 
training functions.  
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Central hospitals are for catchment populations of 800,000 and above, and have 
sub specializations in internal medicine, surgery, paediatrics, obstetrics, 
gynaecology, intensive care, psychiatry, training, and research. These hospitals also 
act as referral centres for second level hospitals.  
There are also some indications that inequalities exist in the health care provision. 
For instance, over 80 percent of the population access health care from the public 
health system of which the quality is quite variable according to geographical areas, 
while the remaining 20 percent access care from mission facilities and other private 
health care institutions (CSO, 2008; MoH/NHSP, 2011 - 2015). Health centres are 
however the main providers of primary health services with those in rural areas 
catering for up to 5000 households while those in urban areas serve as many as 
20,000 households (Masiye, Chitah & McIntyre, 2010).The public sector is thus 
overwhelmed by the volume of the users.  
1.3.1  Distribution of health facilities in Zambia by ownership 
The different types of health care providers are distinctly concentrated in different 
parts of urban and rural Zambia. Nonetheless, Ministry of Health and Ministry of 
Community Development Mother and Child Health facilities are found throughout the 
country though, in general, most facilities are concentrated in urban areas with most 
of its personnel and expenditures located along the urban areas (Berman et al., 
1995; MoH/NHSP, 2011 - 2015). For instance, Mine hospitals and clinics, most of 
which are now under government control, are almost exclusively located on the 
Copperbelt. While, Mission hospitals are located mostly in rural areas of the more 
peripheral and poorer districts of the country, for-profit (private) facilities are limited 
to the urban centres, with private hospitals located almost exclusively along the line 




percent) part of the health care delivery system in Zambia, while a larger (79 
percent) share of the sector is under government control and the remaining share of 
about 6.3 percent is under the control of missionaries ((MoH/NHSP, 2011 - 2015).   
While the distribution of health facilities mostly reflects demand factors (i.e. the 
higher cash incomes and population densities in urban areas), the distribution of 
private hospitals are closely parallels to the distribution of health care providers by 
the Ministry of Health. Further, most of these hospitals are staffed by a mix of full-
time private physicians and part-time assistants, who hold full-time jobs elsewhere in 
Ministry of Health facilities (Berman et al., 1995). The supply of private health 
facilities is therefore closely related to the supply of medical personnel in the public 
sector.  
The number of public sector Medical Officers, Medical Licentiates, Clinical Officers, 
Nurses and Midwives (clinical HWs) as of December 2009 was 0.93 per 1,000 
populations (CSO, 2009). These numbers are nevertheless skewed towards the 
urban areas, leaving the rural areas extremely vulnerable. As a result, public facilities 
in rural and remote areas have the lowest number of health workers, compared to 
urban areas. It is estimated that rural areas have seventy (70) clinical health care 
workers per 100,000 populations relative to one hundred fifty nine (159) per 100,000 
in urban areas. The situation is so severe that there are still a number of Health 
facilities in the rural areas which are run by unqualified staff or only one qualified 







1.4  Statement of the problem 
Zambia has been struggling to meet the financial burden of escalating demand for 
health services arising from rapidly growing populations and changing disease 
patterns. Zambia like many other developing countries is overwhelmed by low 
absolute levels of investment in health, inequalities and elevated proportion of non-
pooled out of pocket spending. The challenge thus remains for government to 
implement a health financing strategy that not only involves ensuring equitable 
financial access to quality health services, but also guarantees protection from 
financial devastation that comes with paying for health services (Collins et al., 1996; 
Masiye, Chitah & McIntyre, 2010). 
Immediately after attaining independence, the Zambian government, compelled by 
the desire to fulfil its election manifesto, and guided by a socialist ideology, 
embarked on a large social programme. An important component of that programme 
was a rapid improvement of access to modern health care facilities for all Zambians 
through an increase in public financing and provision of health care. The realisation 
of this goal was assisted by Zambia’s small population and an expanding economy, 
fuelled by large foreign exchange earnings from copper that allowed for large public 
sector allocations to the health budget (Wake et al., 2008). During these times of 
prosperity, privately owned (for-profit) hospitals and clinics were however 
discouraged as the state could afford to provide free quality health care to its people. 
For example, in an international comparison, Hanson and Berman (1995) found that 
the proportion of Zambia’s private (for profit) health sector was small compared with 
other countries in the region. 
But between 1974 and 1994, (after the first and second oil crises), the price of 




unprecedented rate. During this period, per capita income decreased by 50% and 
Zambia became the 25th poorest country in the world (Nachuk & Kundra, 2008). As 
the economy progressively worsened, so did public sector financing, yet health and 
education bore the brunt of this rapid and dramatic fall in economic performance. 
Hence, resource allocation to the health sector  for example, dropped from US$26 
per capita in the 1970s to US$6 per capita in the 1990s (Nakamba et al., 2002). 
During this period, the health system encountered a number of challenges that 
included the following: reduced funding and inequity in the distribution of resources; 
deterioration of morbidity and mortality indicators due to the poor quality of health 
services and increased demand for health care services resulting from an increase in 
population, especially in urban areas (mainly due to rural-urban migration). 
These challenges however undermined equity in financing health care. Therefore, in 
addressing these challenges, user fees were introduced in all public health facilities 
in 1993 (CSO, 2008). However, the introduction of user fees defined as payments 
levied at the point of use of any element of public health services and may include 
registration cost, consultation cost, or fees for drugs has been the subject of much 
debate since its inception (Lagarde & Palmer, 2011; Zikusooka et al., 2009). 
Promoters of user fees argue that they are aimed at increasing funds to the health 
sector; reducing unnecessary consumption of health care services; increasing quality 
of services available; and consequently increasing utilisation of services (Lagarde & 
Palmer, 2011). Notwithstanding, recent evidence shows the negative impact of 
introducing user fees on health service utilisation. For instance, the uptake of 
curative services decreased in Kenya, Burkina Faso and Papua New Guinea 
following the introduction of user fees. Whether or not this decrease continued over 




achieve any of the success criteria initially outlined and have proven to be a 
discriminatory, ineffective, and uneconomical financing mechanism because 
contributions are expected to be made regardless of an individual’s ability to pay.  
Apart from the direct costs of health services, poor people encounter other economic 
barriers such as high transport costs, and the opportunity cost of missing work. As a 
result, the fusion of indirect costs and out of pocket payments has in actual fact 
prohibited poor people from the formal health-care system. Opponents of out of 
pocket payments on the other hand argue that these  payments are often made 
through anguish, selling of assets, high interest loans from local money lenders, 
borrowing from relatives or friends and, therefore, inflict  financial burden and poverty 
on some households seeking care and they do not provide any protection from 
devastating illness, and affects the poor most of all (Lagarde & Palmer, 2011;  
Masiye, Chitah & McIntyre, 2010). User fees were also seen to impose financial 
hardship and financial barriers to access health care in some countries especially in 
developing countries like Zambia.  
Certainly, this policy on cost recovery through user fees did not last so long. The late 
1990s, for instance, witnessed a renewal of interest in equity (Gwartkin eta l., 2004) 
with evidence particularly from African countries starting to show that the 
expectations of cost recovery policies have not been fully met (Jones, 2006).  In 
2006, Zambia removed user fees at all the public facilities in rural areas and in 
November 2011 user fees for primary healthcare were further eliminated in urban 
areas, but were maintained at tertiary hospitals such as the University Teaching 
Hospital (UTH) and Central hospitals in Ndola and Kitwe (Cuesta, Suarez-Becerra & 




Following the removal of user fees, a recent study reported that utilisation of health 
services has increased by 50 percent, particularly among the population aged 5 
years and above, living in rural areas (Masiye, Chitah & McIntyre, 2010). These 
results reflect those of other countries such as Uganda, where user fees were 
abolished in 2001 and subsequent studies showed that the most poor benefited 
more(Yates,  2009). Of great concern is that although removing user fees may lead 
to increased utilisation of health services, the quality of health care in most cases 
may be compromised because of the scarcity of finances to support the adequate 
provision of drugs and skilled health workers in health facilities and the decline in the 
quality of health services may cause some consumers to go to private facilities 
where they are forced to pay higher fees thereby making them poorer (Anyangwe, 
Mtonga & Chirwa, 2006;  Gottret & Schieber, 2006).   
Currently, there has been a great deal of interest among international organisations 
(World Bank,2005; WHO, 2000; WHO, 2005) in developing health financing systems 
that ensure that people have access to health care without facing financial 
hardships.  Zambia is however in the process of implementing these financing 
reforms (social health insurance scheme) (MoH, 2012). Although equity has long 
been considered as an important goal in the health sector as stated in the Ministry of 
Health vision, inequalities between the poor and the better off persist (World Bank, 
2012).  
As a result, the poor tend to suffer higher rates of mortality and morbidity than do the 
better-off (CSO, 2012). They often use health services less, despite having higher 
levels of need (Phiri, & Ataguba, 2014). Thus, the “inverse care law” which was 
described by Tudor (1971) more than three decades ago, and according to which the 




health care than do healthy and better off people, remains alive. Consequently, the 
poor and disadvantaged often face greater disease and financial burden (World 
Bank, 2012). Indeed, some non-poor households may be made poor precisely 
because of health shocks that necessitate out of pocket spending on health. 
Hence, as countries like Zambia commit to improving equity in health care financing 
through the implementation of health financing reforms that are aimed at improving 
health financing and debate increases on the relative merits and demerits of various 
financing mechanisms, it is important that better evidence be made available on 
equity implications. For instance, the WHO Health Financing Strategy for Africa 
(2006) stressed that government must strive to not only ensure equitable financial 
access to quality health services; but also guarantee protection from financial 
devastation that comes with paying for health services.  
Further, the 58th World Health Assembly (2005) recommended that Member States 
like Zambia should ensure that health financing includes a prepayment scheme of 
financial contributions in order to increase risk-sharing and protect citizens against 
financial devastation and impoverishment linked to paying for health services. This is 
because prepayment enables pool members to make advance payments for average 
expected expenditures, thereby lessening uncertainty and ensuring equity in 
financing (Zikusooka et al., 2009).  
On the other hand, World Health Organisation (2010) urged member states to aim 
for affordable universal health coverage for all citizens on the basis of equity.  
Although the generally accepted core of universal health coverage is that the health 
system should be financed in accordance with the ability to pay (Mills et al., 2012), 




the benefit, but also to their effects on the distribution of income (van Doorslaer et 
al., 1999). This is because of the effect that financing health care can have on 
income distribution despite its primary core of providing resources to the health 
sector (Bilger, 2008; Ataguba, 2010).  
Since financing health care impacts on income distribution in a country, it is generally 
agreed that a progressive health care financing system, that places less burden on 
the poor than the rich, is preferred to a regressive one. As a result, regressive health 
care financing is normally regarded as inequitable (Wagstaff, 2002) and unfair. Thus, 
this lack of a health care financing strategy that provides financial protection in the 
health sector in Zambia implies that many households, rural and urban, face a 
financial burden when seeking health services. However, some countries where out 
of pocket payments have remained predominantly high have introduced user fee 
exemptions as a measure of equity. But many empirical studies have shown that 
user fees exemptions have not rightly been implemented and targeted (McIntyre et 
al., 2010).  
For example, Zambia introduced exemption policies soon after the introduction of 
user fees. Implementation of these policies in Zambia like in many other countries 
has however been found to be very ineffective in reaching the target population 
(Masiye, Chitah & McIntyre, 2010). Hence the equity objectives they were meant to 
achieve were not successful. Certainly, in other countries like Ghana and Tanzania 
(Mill, 2012) out of pocket payments are replaced with alternative mechanisms of 
health care financing such as prepayment schemes (such as mandatory health 
insurance schemes) which do not require people to pay at the point of use of health 
services. Nonetheless, prepayment schemes (e.g. voluntary private prepayment) in 




by people of high socio-economic status.  This is a small proportion of the Zambian 
population. 
On the other hand, out of pocket payments defined as payments made by 
households directly to health providers at the point of receiving health services may 
not be a good source of health care financing. This is because payments are mostly 
made at the point of use of health services. This tends to be inequitable in the sense 
that both the poor and rich are made to face similar health costs (e.g. in countries 
where there are no sliding payments for OOP).  
But equity in financing requires that payments are made according to ability to pay 
(ATP). This is a desirable policy objective in most countries, both developing and 
developed. For this reason, health financing reforms ought to reduce inequities due 
to OOP payments and public funding system. This study therefore intends to provide 
empirical evidence on redistributive effect of two broad mechanisms of health care 
financing (general tax and out of pocket payment) in Zambia. The study thus seeks 
to answer the following questions:   
1.5  Research Questions 
1. What is the nature of the income redistributive effect of public health finance 
(general tax) in Zambia? 
2. What is the nature of the income redistributive effect of out of pocket (OOP) 
payments for health care in Zambia? 
3. What is the overall pattern of income redistributive effect of health care 




4. What are the implications of the current income redistributive effect of health 
care financing for pursuing universal health coverage in Zambia? 
1.6  Research objectives 
1.6.1   Main objective 
The main aim of the study is to assess the income redistributive effect of two broad 
health care financing mechanisms (general tax and out of pocket payments) in 
Zambia. 
1.6.2  Sub objectives 
1 To investigate and describe the nature of the income redistributive effect of 
public health finance (general tax) in Zambia 
2 To assess and describe the nature of the income redistributive effect of out of 
pocket (OOP) payments for health care in Zambia 
3 To establish the overall pattern of income redistributive effects of health care 
financing in Zambia 
4 To analyse and describe the implications of the current income redistributive 
effects of health care financing for pursuing universal health coverage in 
Zambia 
1.7  Significance of the study 
The need for health care financing mechanisms that are equitable in Zambia cannot 
be over-emphasized. It is necessary that health care financing mechanisms are in 
such a way that they are related to ability to pay. Thus, the significance of this study 
is to inform and support the on-going policy dialogue with empirical based evidence 




as well as expand our knowledge of the characteristics of equity as a basis of 
addressing these inequalities.  
Certainly, the starting point in considering equity in financing health care is the 
requirement that health care ought to be financed according to the ability to pay 
(O'Donnell et al., 2008). This is the principle of vertical equity, which requires that 
individuals with unequal ability to pay should pay disproportionately unequally. 
Consequently, an equitable health care system would be one in which payments for 
health care are positively related to the ability to pay. However, it is not still clear 
whether or not the existing health care financing mechanisms (out of pocket 
payments and tax) are equitable and can foster equity in the financing of health care 
in Zambia. This study will thus provide an empirical assessment of income 
distribution of financing health care in Zambia and its equity implications. Such 
evidence is important in formulating policies that will provide for an equitable health 
financing system in the country. 
This study will also employ new methodological tools that have been developed to 
improve the measurement of equity in financing health care by decomposing these 
financing mechanisms. Therefore, it is not adequate only to talk about inequalities, 
but also necessary to demonstrate objectively the existence of inequalities that are 
not only unfair and unjust, and yet mutable (Andersen, 1995).  
Even though there is considerable amount of theoretical literature on equity in health 
care financing, very few studies if any have attempted to look at the income 
redistributive effect of public finance (general tax) and out of pocket (OOP) payments 
for health care in Zambia. In the past, for example, most studies on healthcare 




distributions of health spending by socioeconomic groups, using simple tabulations 
and summary indices as opposed to decomposition methods employed in the 
context of developed countries (McIntyre et al, 2005).  
This study will therefore contribute to a better understanding of health care financing 
inequities arising from two broad health care financing mechanisms; general tax and 
out of pocket (OOP), and their implications as the country plans to move towards 
universal health coverage. It is also intended that the findings of this study will be 
used to inform future development and implementation of policy on health care 
financing reforms in Zambia. 
This study therefore investigates the extent to which financing health care in Zambia 
redistributes income, particularly whether or not it reduces income inequality. This 
study, thus, seeks to decompose health care finances into horizontal, vertical and re 
ranking. 
2.  Research methodology 
This study uses the Aronson- Johnson and Lambert  (1994) methodology (hereafter 
AJL) to evaluate income redistribution associated with paying for health care in 
Zambia and adopt the conceptual and analytical frameworks for analysing financing 
equity using household survey data proposed by O’Donnell et al (2008). This 
framework has been widely used in many studies on progressivity and redistributive 
effect of health financing for analysing how equitable OOP payments and taxes are 
in financing health services (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 1992; van Doorslaer et al., 
1999; O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al., 2008).  
Aronson et al (1994) model demonstrated that redistributive effect can be 




and re-ranking(R). By simultaneously revealing these three different dimensions of 
equity, the AJL decomposition constitutes a useful tool for assessing the fairness of 
health system financing (Bilger, 2008). van de Ven et al. (2001) (hereafter VCL) on 
the other hand showed that the expression of the AJL decomposition is not adequate 
when near-equal households are grouped, and proposed a criterion for choosing the 
bandwidth. However, this criterion requires financing to be progressive, which is not 
the case with many financing sources of the health system like in Zambia. 
Furthermore, VCL do not solve the theoretical problem raised by grouping, which is 
not to measure the horizontal inequality in the classical sense (Bilger, 2008). 
Moreover, a measure of redistributive effect that has gained some attention in 
income redistribution studies is the Reynolds and Smolensky Index (Reynolds & 
Smolensky, 1977). There is however a fundamental assumption underlying the 
Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) index that assumes horizontal equity (equal 
treatment of equals) (Ichoku, 2006).  Horizontal inequity is however more likely to be 
the norm rather than an exception (Ichoku, 2006). Indeed, the Reynolds & 
Smolensky (1977) index has further exposed another weakness of not taking into 
account the reranking effect. This calls for the model like the AJL that decomposes 
health care financing mechanisms into V, R and H. 
The overall influence of a given financing on income redistribution can thus be 
measured by ways of redistributive effect (RE), defined as difference between the 
pre and post financing inequalities indices (Reynolds & Smolensky, 1977). This 
method of decomposition is especially useful for cross sectional data like the one to 




Although, one way of measuring the redistributive effect of any payment on the 
redistribution of incomes is to compare the inequality as measured by the Gini 
coefficient of pre-payment income with the inequality in post-payment incomes, the 
redistributive impact can be defined as the reduction in the Gini coefficient caused by 
the payment. Hence,  
RE= GX - GX-P ……………………………………………………………………………. (1) 
where GX and GX-P are the pre-payment and post-payment Gini coefficients 
respectively, where X denotes pre-payment income, or more generally some 
measure of ability to pay (O'Donnell & Wagstaff, 2008; Wagstaff & Van Doorslaer, 
2001), and P denotes the payment. However, Aronson, Johnson and Lambert, 
(1994)  showed that equation (1) RE can be written as; 
RE = V – H – R …………………………………….. …………………………………... (2) 
where V is vertical redistribution, H is horizontal inequity and R is the degree of 
reranking.  
The horizontal effect (H) and re-ranking (R) effects however can never be negative. 
The vertical effect (V) on the other hand measures the progressivity or regressivity of 
the financing in the absence of both the H and R. In order to be able to distinguish 
and compute these components, there is need to artificially create groups of pre-
payment equals. This is done by defining certain pre-payment income intervals, and 
then labelling all households with incomes in that range as equals. Equation (2) is 
therefore an important result because it reveals that a progressive financing has a 





But, the pursuit of equity in health care financing is embedded in various theories of 
distributive justice that defines how countries handle equity in health care. The way a 
country defines equity in health care financing depends on which theory of social 
justice they follow, that is for example, egalitarian or libertarian. The egalitarian 
viewpoint suggests that a state sector should predominate, with health care being 
distributed according to “need” and financed according to “ability to pay”. The 
libertarian viewpoint, suggest a mainly private health care sector, with health care 
being rationed primarily according to willingness and ability to pay (Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer, 1998). Therefore, this study follows the egalitarian perspective where 
health care is financed according to ability to pay. 
2.1  Scope of the study 
This is a quantitative study restricted to two mechanisms of health care financing; 
general tax and out of pockets payments. By narrowing down to two  mechanisms of 
health care financing (general tax and out of pocket payments), the study excludes 
donor funds and private health insurance as they are very low (2.3% as private 
prepaid of total health expenditure in 2011 according to 2010 WHO data base), 
Although there is a significant donor funding to the health care, it will not be 
measured separately, because the burden of grants falls on citizens of the donor 
country and interest payments on loans are paid back through general tax revenue. 
The burden will therefore be captured through tax incidence analysis.  However, 
assessment of income redistribution effect in health care finance requires 
examination of all sources of health sector funding and not simply those payments 
that are made exclusively for health care.  
So, in addition to out of pocket payments defined as payments made by households 




earmarked health taxes, the distributional burden of all direct and indirect taxes is 
relevant in this case where some health care is financed from general government 
revenues.  
Out of pocket payments are however not reimbursed by any prepayment scheme. 
They could either be paid at a public or private facility. In this analysis, out of pocket 
payments will include costs of medicines, fees to medical personnel (e.g. Doctors / 
Medical Assistant / Nurses /Dentist, etc.), payments to hospital/health centre/surgery 
and fees to traditional healers. Nevertheless, expenditure on health-related 
transportation will be excluded. This circumvents imputation of transport costs for 
households using private means of transportation. Hence, total out of pocket 
payments for each household will be adjusted by adult-equivalent household size to 
reflect each household member’s out of pocket payments payment experience.  
While on direct tax, personal income tax will be calculated using household reported 
income and reported consumption expenditure as a proxy of income and compared 
with reported income tax. Since, there is no consensus in the literature as to how to 
deal with corporate income tax in terms of incidence assumptions (Nevin 1963; 
Bradford, 1981; Kotlikoff & Summers, 1987) and it is generally assumed that 
shareholders and consumers bear the burden of the tax through lower profits and 
higher prices on goods and services respectively (Martinez & Vasquez 2001). It has 
however been observed that a market condition and extent of competition can affect 
the allocation of the burden of the corporate tax, with consumers being more likely to 
bear the  burden as the degree of monopoly power increases (Herberger 1962; Mtei 




Three scenarios will therefore be considered for the calculation of corporate tax: 
Initially, consumer bear all corporate tax through an increase in commodity prices; it 
therefore implies that corporate tax revenue will be allocated to households based on 
their share of consumption of domestically manufactured goods and services. 
Secondly, that shareholders bear all corporate tax through reductions in dividends, 
this means that corporate tax will be allocated to the households in the first and 
second richest quintiles who reported owning dividends, based on their share of total 
dividend ownership. As a result, one would expect shareholders to be concentrated 
among the higher income groups. And finally that the burden of corporate tax is 
shared equally between consumers and shareholder hence, the burden of corporate 
tax is assumed to be shared evenly between households consuming domestically 
manufactured goods and dividend owners. The incidence of consumption taxes will 
therefore be analysed by applying a respective tax rate to the reported consumption 
of goods and services which qualify for such taxation. 
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer et al. (1999), for example, posit that assumptions must 
also be made about distributions of financing sources that cannot be estimated from 
the survey data. It will therefore be assumed that missing direct taxes are distributed 
as a weighted average of the direct taxes for which distributions can be estimated 
and likewise for indirect taxes.  Non-tax government revenues are nevertheless 
assumed to be distributed as a weighted average of all other payments. Thus, the 
study will consider the distribution of financing across the domestic population only 
and so exclude foreign aid completely from the analysis.  
In this study, observations with zero or a missing value of disposable income will be 
eliminated from the data while household weights will be applied for the calculation 




aggregate by source and at the household level, in relation to ability to pay (ATP). To 
do this, both macro and micro data will be used. The macro data will be mostly from 
National Health Accounts (NHA) estimates while micro data will be from household 
expenditure or socio-economic surveys.  
In order to describe the distribution of total health payments in relation to ability to 
pay, we will combine the micro and macro data. The micro data will give the 
distribution of each of the two mechanisms of health care finance, while, the macro 
data will provide the weight to be attached to each distribution when aggregating to 
obtain the distribution of total payments. 
2.2  Data sources 
Household surveys are implemented on a regular basis in many countries and are 
probably the most important source of data for health equity analysis (O’Donnel et al, 
2008). In this study, the latest 2010 Zambia Living Condition Monitoring Survey 
(LCMS) data were used to analyse income redistribution of out of pocket payments 
and taxes. The LCMS was conducted by Central Statistical Office (CSO) between 
January and April 2010 and CSO used a two staged stratified cluster sampling 
design (CSO, 2010).  
The 2010 LCMS collected data on the living conditions of households and persons in 
the areas of education, health, economic activities and employment, child nutrition, 
death in the households, income sources, income levels, food production, household 
consumption expenditure, access to clean and safe water and sanitation, housing 
and access to various socioeconomic facilities and infrastructure such as schools, 




The merits of using this kind of the data are that the data are nationally 
representative of the country as well as for subpopulations. The survey has also rich 
data on health, living standards, and other complementary variables. Furthermore, 
the LCMS is often conducted on a regular basis. It is used to update the consumer 
price index in the country.  Notwithstanding the potential for using the LCMS dataset 
for health equity analysis, it is important to be aware of the common weaknesses of 
such data. In particular, sampling and non-sampling errors can be important and the 
data may not be representative of very small subpopulations. 
From the many variables in the data set, analysis was based on those variables that 
are related to household income, total number of persons in a household and 
household weight (which is used in order to correct for sample bias or non-sampling 
errors) to measure income inequality and the redistributive effect.  
For each of the health financing mechanisms (taxes and direct out-of-pocket 
payments), each household’s total payments was therefore  estimated using 
standard assumptions made in health care financing incidence studies (O'Donnell et 
al., 2008).  However, for taxes, only the proportion of tax revenue that is allocated to 
the health sector was considered.  
Hence, the assumption was that an equal proportion of each tax category is 
allocated to health care funding. The following tax categories were therefore 
considered: personal income tax, corporate income tax, value-added tax (VAT), fuel 







2.3  Research design 
This is a cross sectional study carried out on 2010 Zambia Living Condition 
Monitoring Survey (LCMS). A cross-sectional design is chosen specifically to meet 
the study’s objectives.  
2.4  Study population 
The unit of analysis is an important issue in income distribution studies. It is evident 
that the ultimate source of concern is the welfare of the individual. However, an 
individual is often not the appropriate unit of analysis. For instance, children and 
spouses working at home do not have recorded income, but may nevertheless be 
enjoying a high standard of living as a result of income sharing with parents and 
spouses.  
Studies have used the household income per capita (or per member) measure to 
adjust total incomes according to the number of persons in the household. However, 
in the last decades, equivalence scales have been widely used in the literature on 
income distribution (Figini, 1998).  Therefore, the unit of analysis in this study will be 
the households and equivalent adult economies of scales will be applied following 
Deaton et al., (2002) recommendation. The survey consisted of approximately 
20,000 households (i.e. 102,882 individuals) (CSO, 2010). However, in this study, as 
earlier stated, the unit of analysis is the household.  After cleaning the data by 
excluding those with missing information on health expenditure and other variables 








2.5  Data analysis 
Analysis of data for this study was carried out using the World Bank ADePT software 
for economic analysis (www.worldbank.org/adept). The ADePT software uses 
STATA codes developed by O’Donnell eta l, (2008) in their manual which is widely 
used to analyse equity in health care financing using household data. 
2.6  Ethics approval  
The protocol was handed in to the ethics committee at the University of Cape Town 
Research and Ethics for ethical approval, and permission was sought from Zambia 
Central Statistical Office to use their dataset. Once ethical approval was granted and 
permission given, data analysis begun immediately. Since, this study was based on 
secondary dataset; the analysis did not at all contain information on any single 
individual or household in the dataset. The dataset used was already coded and no 
individual or household could be identified. 
2.7  Stakeholders and report dissemination 
A copy of the thesis report and findings will be publicly availed to all the 
stakeholders. Particularly, the policy recommendation section of the thesis will also 
be publicly available and disseminated to all the stakeholders including Ministry of 
Health, Zambia. In addition, findings of this research are presented in a manuscript 
of an article for submission to an appropriate peer reviewed journal. Additionally, a 









2.8  Limitations 
Anticipated limitations of the study relates to the use of the secondary data in the 
assessment of the income redistribution of health care financing mechanisms. The 
LCMS is a large National household survey of reported income and expenditure. 
This national dataset has been designed for several purposes such as monitoring 
the living conditions of the Zambian population. In addition, the scope, focus, and 
measurement approaches can vary across surveys and over time, limiting the scope 
for comparisons across countries. 
2.9  Logistics 
Once dataset is obtained, data analysis will commence immediately. Table 1 and 2 
below summarized the work plan and a budget. 
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Table 2: Budget 
S/No item Description Rate (ZAR) Quantity Total 
Cost(ZAR) 
1 Transport Data collection  
  
3500 1 3500 
Travel expenses 3000 2 6000 
2 stationary Protocol 0.5/page 
 





30 pages 15 











200 1 200 
3 Communication Internet (bundles)per 
month 
400 6 2400 
4 Dissemination Conference/seminar 4000 1 4000 
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1.  Introduction 
This chapter reviews literature on relevant concepts for this study. Literature on 
equity in health care financing, measurement of progressivity and income 
redistributive effect studies are reviewed. The chapter begins by introducing the 
search strategies used in obtaining relevant studies, and defining key concepts used 
in the study. This is then followed by methods for measuring equity and income 
redistributive effect in health care financing, and a review of empirical studies on 
decomposing inequality in health financing mechanisms. The final part of this 
chapter is a summary of the literature reviewed. 
2.  Research strategies 
Google Scholar and PubMed are the main search engines used to source relevant 
articles. Others include Science Direct and Science Citation Index. Key websites, 
including those of World Health Organisation and the World Bank, were also used for 
the search.  The search terms used include “financing incidence”, “redistributive 
effect”, “progressivity and regressivity” and “health financing equity”.  In this study, 
searches were however restricted to reports in English. Articles from both developing 
and developed countries were included in the review. An assessment of the quality 
of the evidence was done by critically reviewing the methods used in each study 
relative to the internationally established methods for financing incidence analyses 






3.  Definition of key concepts 
In the following subsections, some key concepts that are used in this study are 
explained. 
3.1  Equity in health care financing 
Equity, like efficiency, is a goal that is pursued by policy makers in all types of health 
care systems. It is widely acknowledged to be an important goal in the field of health 
care (Wagstaff, Doorslaer & Paci, 1989). The pursuit of equity in health care 
financing is embedded in various theories of distributive justice that defines how 
countries handle equity in health care financing (Ataguba, 2012). Two generally 
dominant approaches to discussing equity are the egalitarian and libertarian 
approaches. Egalitarians would judge equity by assessing the extent to which health 
care is distributed according to need, and financing according to ability to pay 
(Wagstaff, Doorslaer & Paci, 1989). In contrast, the libertarian approach points 
towards a mainly private health care sector, with health care being rationed primarily 
according to willingness and ability to pay (Wagstaff, Doorslaer & Paci, 1989). 
However, when looking at health care financing, most policy makers and analysts 
appear to accept the principle that equity means that payments for health care 
should be according to ability to pay rather than in relation to the amount of health 
care received (O'Donnell & Wagstaff, 2008). Hence, equity in health care financing is 
mainly based on how progressive (or regressive) the health care financing 
mechanisms is (O'Donnell & Wagstaff, 2008). 
Notwithstanding, one way of assessing equity in health care financing is to look at 
the relative progressivity of the health care financing mechanisms (e.g. general tax, 




community based health insurance) individually and collectively (O'Donnell & 
Wagstaff, 2008).  
4.  Approaches to measuring equity in health care financing 
Equity in health care financing is associated with financing health care according to 
ability to pay (Ataguba, 2012). On this Wagstaff, (2002 p.114) notes that “most policy 
makers feel  comfortable with the ability principle as the underlying principle of health 
care finance” and it is “most unlikely that, if any, most interpreted this in terms of a 
hard and fast rule on proportionality.”  But, it is rarely the case to have policy makers 
specify either how ability to pay is to be defined or the preferred progressivity 
relationship between payments and ability to pay (Ataguba, 2012;Wagstaff & 
Doorslaer, 2001; Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 1993).  
Generally, the current literature on equity in health care financing is based on the 
horizontal equity principle and the vertical equity principle. These two related 
principles are however closely linked to the ability to pay principle. The vertical equity 
concept involves the unequal but equitable treatment of equals or reducing welfare 
gaps between unequal individuals. In health care financing, this vertical equity 
principle is linked to the analysis of progressivity and it requires that households, 
individuals or groups with different abilities to pay, pay appropriately different 
amounts for the health care (Ataguba, 2012). 
Horizontal equity principle on the other hand requires that households, individuals or 
groups with the same ability to pay make the same contribution to health care 
(Cissé, Luchini & Moatti, 2007; Wagstaff & Van Doorslaer, 2000; Culyer & Wagstaff, 
1993). The operation of horizontal equity (HE) is rarely questioned because of its 




equity principle could and should be implemented and how great any differential 
payments would be that should be described as vertical equity (Ataguba, 2012). 
Another notion used in describing equity in health care financing is the absence of 
reranking of individuals, households or groups as a result of health care payments 
(Ataguba, 2012; Duclos, et al., 2003; Wagstaff, 2002; Van Doorslaer et al., 1999; 
Gerdtham & Sundberg, 1998; Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 1997). The general view 
here is that households should maintain their prepayment ranks even after making 
payments for health care. Therefore, a violation of this entails a reranking of 
households (Ataguba, 2012).  
Studies in the context of developed countries that assess equity in health care 
financing have however demonstrated that different forms of health care financing 
schemes or mechanisms may be associated with horizontal inequality and reranking 
effect2 (Van Doorslaer et al., 1999; Gerdtham & Sundberg, 1998; Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer, 1997).  This is more likely in the context of developing countries where 
income protection mechanisms are still far underdeveloped and where high 
proportions of health care expenditures are financed by households through OOP 
payments (Musgrove et al., 2002).  
5.  Redistributive effect of health care financing 
Redistribution can occur when payments toward the financing of health care are 
mainly compulsory and independent of utilization; most obviously when health care 
is partly financed from government tax revenues (O'Donnell & Wagstaff, 2008). 
Contributions toward the finance of health care may thus redistribute disposable 
income. Redistribution can be vertical and horizontal (O'Donnell & Wagstaff, 2008). 
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The former occurs when payments are disproportionately related to ability to pay 
(ATP). The extent of vertical redistribution can therefore be inferred from measures 
of progressivity, while horizontal redistribution occurs when persons with equal ATP 
contribute unequally to health care payments (O'Donnell & Wagstaff, 2008). Since 
equity in health care financing relates to ability to pay (income), redistribution 
involves taking away some resources from the rich and distributing these to the poor 
or from the poor to the rich.  
However, such redistribution may extend beyond income, money or health care 
payments to the distribution of other social goods and services which enhance 
welfare (O'Donnell & Wagstaff, 2008). Thus, in general, health care financing 
systems may well have some income redistributive effects (O'Donnell & Wagstaff, 
2008). These may be intended or unintended, pro poor or pro rich. Pro poor 
redistribution means that the distribution of income net of taxes and payments is 
more equal than the distribution of gross income (Ataguba, 2012).  
However, in many empirical studies of the redistributive effect of health care 
financing, the redistributive effect (RE) is measured as the difference between the 
Gini index of income before any payment (GX) and the Gini index of post payment 
income (GX-T) (Reynolds & Smolensky, 1977). This distributive effect has been 
decomposed into three main components – horizontal, vertical and reranking 
(Aronson, Johnson & Lambert, 1994). 
While the analysis of progressivity and distribution of the burden of payments may 
show and provide insights into some aspects of vertical equity, it cannot reveal 
distinctively the extent of horizontal inequity and the reranking or rank reversal that 




methods only capture how such payments vary with some measure of ability to pay 
(Ataguba, 2012).  
It is nonetheless worth noting that horizontal inequities could arise in a vertical 
equitable health care payment system or tax because of, for example, variations in 
tax or payment  rates across regions and provinces, the existence of tax deductibles 
for certain categories of individuals, differences in the incidence of illness faced, 
risked rated contributions to health insurance schemes and differences in the 
sources of income (such as formal employment or informal employment)  (Wagstaff 
& van Doorslaer, 1997). 
With respect to personal income tax, where most of these analytical techniques have 
been developed and applied, horizontal inequity can still occur—though it is less of a 
concern in this context as the tax rates are usually progressively structured with 
income (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 1997). However, in the context of indirect taxes 
(e.g. value added tax, excise taxes and sales taxes) and other payments, because 
these are associated with the individual’s tastes, choice, life styles and level of 
consumption, differential treatments can arise (van Doorslaer et al., 1999) and may 
not be closely linked to ability to pay (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 1997). Since there 
is some degree of choice involved when one considers the non-compulsory 
payments, it may be difficult to label some of these treatments as inequitable.  
Generally, the primary objective of any health care financing is not to redistribute 
income, but to generate resources for the health care system (Bilger, 2008) and to 
ensure that households are fairly treated when financing health care (Ataguba, 
2012). But, for health care financing to have a redistributive effect, voluntary 




(O'Donnell & Wagstaff, 2008).The methodologies that are often used in such 
analysis are as discussed in the methodological section. 
6.  Methods for measuring progressivity in health care financing 
There are various ways in the literature for measuring progressivity. Assessing 
progressivity in health care financing however involves relating health care payments 
to household’s income or some other measure of ATP (O'Donnell & Wagstaff, 2008). 
Yet, depending on what proportion of income is paid by the rich and poor, the 
relationship can be progressive, proportional or regressive (Ataguba, 2012). A 
progressive mechanism or system is one in which health care payments rise as a 
proportion of income as income rises, whilst a regressive system is one in which 
payments falls as a proportion of income as income rises and a proportion system is 
one in which health care payments account for the same proportion of income for 
everyone, irrespective of their income (Ataguba, 2010).  
According to (Ataguba, 2012), this, however, raises certain crucial questions: what is 
the preferred relationship between income and health care payments? Should it be 
progressive? If so, how progressive should it be? Such progressivity has however no 
agreed extent (Wagstaff, 2002), and what is equitable tends to vary from one country 
to another (or from one society to another society) (Ataguba, 2012). 
But, regardless of the choice of method, when one is interested in examining 
progressivity in the entire health care system, two major steps are however involved. 
Initially, the relative progressivity of each financing mechanism is assessed, 
secondly, progressivity in the overall system is evaluated (O'Donnell & Wagstaff, 
2008) taking into consideration the relative contribution of each financing mechanism 




6.1  Tabulation approaches 
There are a number of ways of measuring the burden of health care financing. While 
there is considerable amount of empirical evidence on redistributive effects of 
taxation, very few studies have investigated the income redistributive effects of 
health care financing. In fact, many of those who carried out these studies used 
simple tabulation methods to examine the redistributive effects of health care 
financing.  
Thus, the simplest and crudest method used by some researchers is to compare 
different quantiles’ shares of income spent on the health care and try to deduce 
progressivity (Hurst, 1992). This method is based on the tabulation of total 
contributions to health care financing relative to income across social economic 
groups. It follows by grouping households into quantiles (e.g. quintiles, or deciles). 
Hence, for each quantile, the share of income spent on health care through each 
mechanism (e.g. OOP, tax,) is computed. For example, Ataguba & McIntyre (2012) 
and Ataguba (2010) used tables to demonstrate how average payments for health 
care financing mechanism varied according to income groups.  Others studies 
include in Egypt (in 1997) (O'Donnell & Wagstaff, 2008). 
This type of approach of ‘tabulation’ has however some limitations; it is not sensitive 
to variations that may occur close to the cut-off points for categorising households; in 
addition, it does not show a holistic picture of how payments to income ratio vary 
across the entire distribution of income and the exact extent of progressivity cannot 
be obtained simply by looking at these ratios (Ataguba, 2012). Indeed, in some 
instances, it could be difficult to distinguish which mechanism is more progressive or 




In fact, these methods do not provide information regarding the level of progressivity 
(regressively) of different health care financing mechanisms. Therefore, it can be 
difficult to assess progressivity when the bars are almost similar in height or when 
the bars in different quintiles alternate in height (i.e., no clearly discernible pattern).  
This is because equity consideration is concerned more about each household’s 
relative distribution. 
Hence, this method might not be fully appropriate to inform the policy debates 
involved in health sector reform. Accordingly, some of the justifications for this 
challenge appears to derive from conceptual and measurement issues that underlie 
the measurement methods of inequalities (Ataguba, 2012), while others are related 
to the structure of health care financing systems in developing countries (Ataguba, 
2012).  
6.2  Summary indices 
Although analysis of equity in financing of health care has drawn extensively on 
insights and similarities from normative public finance and income redistribution 
literature (Wagstaff & Van Doorslaer, 2000) in recent past, however, there has been 
improvement in methodologies employed in the analysis of redistributive effects of 
health care financing. These studies have gone beyond descriptive analysis to 
develop a single measure of progressivity. Most studies have relied extensively upon 
Kakwani (1977) model to analyse tax progressivity. 
Due to some of the limitations of tabulations methods as earlier stated, some more 
formal indices and curves have been developed and used in the assessment of 
progressivity. These include some forms of the Lorenz curve (Lorenz, 1905), Gini 




Suits index of progressivity (Suits, 1977) and the Kakwani index (1977), though the 
earliest is the Musgrave and Thin index (Musgrave &Thin index, 1948) (as 
referenced in Ataguba, 2012).  
The Musgrave and Thin index compares inequality in prepayment income with that 
of the post payment income. Thus, under the Musgrave and Thin method, if 
inequality in post payment income is less than in prepayment income, the health 
care financing mechanism is said to be progressive while a regressive mechanism 
worsen inequality in the post payment income. However, Kakwani (1977) noted that 
this is not in line with the definition of progressivity – a relative measure as opposed 
to an absolute measure. This is because a measure of progressivity should not 
capture this effect as it measures deviation from proportionality. Hence, this has 
limited the use of the Musgrave and Thin methodology in today’s empirical 
applications (Ataguba, 2012).  
While the Musgrave and Thin methodology has some limitation, The Suits index 
(1977) of progressivity compares the Lorenz curve of prepayment income with the 
relative concentration curve of payments. However, the Suits index has also been 
criticised as being sensitive to the choice of some weighting factor that is based on 
the slope of the Lorenz curve. This is due to the fact that it assigns greater weights to 
deviations from proportionality at higher income groups than departures from 
proportionality at lower income groups (Ataguba, 2012).  
Kakwani (1977) on the other hand proposed a method for assessing progressivity. 
The Kakwani index compares the concentration curve of payments with the Lorenz 





ΠK = CT - GX.......................................................................................................... (1) 
where ΠK is the Kakwani index, CT is the concentration index of payments and GX is 
the Gini index of prepayment income. Thus, a progressive (regressive) payment 
occurs when CT > GX (CT < GX), while a proportional payment occurs when CT = GX. 
In this case, ΠK >0 indicates a progressive payment while ΠK < 0 a regressive 
payment and ΠK = 0 a proportional payment. 
The Kakwani index has however been widely used in applied research in health 
economics and public economics (O'Donnell & Wagstaff, 2008).One of the 
characteristic of the Kakwani index is that it is additively separable. This property 
makes it easier to obtain the overall progressivity of health care financing when the 
Kakwani indices of each financing mechanism are known and relative contribution of 
each mechanism to the overall health care financing. Thus, the overall progressivity 
is computed as follows; 
ΠK = ∑iwᵢ ΠiK……………………………………………………………………………… (2) 
where ΠiK is the Kakwani index of health care financing mechanism ᵢ and wᵢ is the 
relative share of health care financing mechanism ᵢ (i.e. general tax, OOP) in the 
overall health care financing. These shares are however obtained from an external 
source such as the National Health Accounts (NHA) (O'Donnell & Wagstaff, 2008). 
While it may be relatively simple to judge progressivity of any health care payment 
mechanism from the value of the Kakwani index (ΠK), the Lorenz and concentration 
curves may intersect or cross each other. When this happens the value of the index 
provides an ambiguous conclusion. However, statistical dominance is used to 




Wagstaff and others have extended and applied these models in the field of health 
care financing (Wagstaff et al., 1999). For example, Wagstaff, Doorslaer & Paci, 
(1989) employed the Kakwani index to confirm the descriptive findings from the 
previous studies in USA, UK and Netherlands. Their results showed that total 
contributions to health care payments in USA, and Netherlands were regressive, 
though more regressive in USA than in the Netherland, while in UK it was 
progressive. However, OOP payments were more regressive in USA but progressive 
in the Netherlands.  
Mostly, conclusion about equity characteristics of various forms of health care 
financing are typically inferred using the summary measures of inequality such as 
the Kakwani index of progressivity (Kakwani, 1977) and the Reynolds-Smolensky 
index of redistribution (Reynolds & Smolensky, 1977).These indices are derived from 
the general class of Gini type indices and rank based measures. They are related to 
the normative notion of unequal treatment of unequal’s and could serve to assess 
the degree to which health care is financed according to ATP and the extent to which 
such financing are associated with (dis)equalizing or equalizing effect on the 
prevalent income inequality, which is a measure of vertical or redistributive effect 
(Ataguba, 2012). They provide a single value measure of magnitude of inequality 
prevailing in a distribution and facilitate comparisons both within and across 
countries (Wagstaff & Van Doorslaer, 1992). 
These methods were however initially introduced into the literature of health 
economics by Wagstaff, Doorslaer and Paci (1989), and were shown to be 
particularly useful for providing comparative information about equity of various 
sources of financing across and within high income countries where health systems 




6.3  Decomposing redistributive effect 
While the summary indices make some good improvement, an exclusive reliance on 
such indices might not reveal the actual equity implications of health care financing 
across different groups of the population. Klavus (2001), for instance, argues that 
due to its generality, a summary measure can indicate significant progressivity or 
regressivity in situations where such outcomes apply only to some part of income 
distribution. Although the inequality assessment given by the summary measure 
would not be incorrect, it would certainly yield an imperfect description of the nature 
of inequality prevailing in the distribution.  
For that reason, such constraint might be particularly problematic in the context of 
developing countries like Zambia. This is because relative discrepancies in the living 
standards across different groups of population predominate and represent a 
common trend in the prevalent distribution, whereas the lack of universal health 
coverage means that large proportions of health expenditures are funded directly 
through out of pocket payments (Gottret & Schieber, 2006). 
Additionally, the random nature of illnesses may result in a widely diverse health 
needs and consequently, varied health care payments across differently groups of 
the population. Therefore, in situations such as Zambia, where health care financing 
is dominated by out of pocket payments and general tax, such random nature of 
illnesses may occasionally culminate into expenditures constituting relatively high 
shares of households’ resources disturbing their material living standard or even 
pushing them below poverty lines (Xu et al., 2003). 
Consequently, the extent to which health care payments are distributed according to 




mainly the underlying distribution of health care need. Certainly, the financial burden 
that direct payments impose in particular on the lowest income groups may lead to 
them using disproportionately less health care despite their greater need and thus, 
the deterrent effect would be probably greater for the poor than for the rich (Ataguba, 
2012; Le Grand, 1991).  
In this regard, health care financing systems can be only mildly regressive or even 
progressive, on average, and thus deemed vertically equitable but such result may 
conceal an inequitable distribution of health care utilisation with respect to need. 
Also, a similar argument holds for  the various forms of health care payments (i.e. 
the degree to which the progressive source of financing through prepayments 
schemes are related to ATP and thus, redistribute income would be questioned by 
the extent of coverage of insurance benefits across different groups of population). 
As a result, a more revealing analysis may require going beyond the summary 
measures to examine inequalities at disaggregate levels. Hence, a decomposing 
analysis approach which has been previous explored in the literature of health care 
financing such as the Aronson, Johnson & Lambert, (1994) model and the Duclos, 
Jalbert & Araar, (2003), may lend itself better to such interpretation.  
The most popular way of measuring the redistributive effect of any compulsory 
health care payment on income distribution is to compare inequality in prepayment 
incomes as measured by e.g. the Gini coefficient with inequality in post payment 
incomes (O'Donnell & Wagstaff, 2008). Income redistributive effect is therefore 
measured by the change in income inequality brought about by health care 
financing. Pre disposable income is thus the household’s disposable income 




disposable income is the household’s disposable income less the amount of 
household private finance directed toward health care (Ataguba, 2012).  
Each Gini coefficient however can take on the values on interval [0, 1].  The RE on 
the other hand can take on the values on the interval [-1, 1].  RE can thus be 
computed simply as the difference between GX and GX-T (Wagstaff & Doorslaer, 
2001). According to Wagstaff and Doorslaer (2001), when the RE is positive, income 
redistribution is said to be pro poor, and when it is negative income redistribution is 
said to be pro rich. In other words, a positive RE will entail an improvement of 
income inequality while a negative indicates an exacerbation of income inequality 
due to payments for health care.  
Aronson, Johnson and Lambert, (1994) model (hereafter AJL), however, makes it 
clear that the redistributive effect of income tax of a particular health care financing 
system will depend not only on its progressivity, but also on the extent of any 
horizontal inequity associated with the system and on the extent of any reranking 
resulting from it. The first of these issues, regardless, has received a good deal of 
attention recently in the literature on health care financing (Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer, 1997). The second and third issues, by contrast, have received less 
attention, particularly in developing countries.  
Depending on the extent of horizontal inequity and reranking involved in health care 
finance, a progressivity analysis can therefore give a misleading impression about 
the income redistribution associated with the financing system. For example, the 
introduction of differential treatment of households on similar equivalent incomes will 
tend to reduce the redistributive effect of a progressive financing system. 




worsen its redistributive effect. Therefore, knowing only the progressivity 
characteristics of the financing system means that one has only a partial picture of 
the income redistribution associated with the financing system in question (Wagstaff 
& van Doorslaer, 1997).  
Redistributive effect may therefore be conceptualised as the equalising or 
disequalising effects associated with the transition between the pre- and post-health 
payment income. A measure of redistributive effect that has gained some attention in 
income distribution studies is the Reynolds and Smolensky Index (Reynolds & 
Smolensky, 1977). There is, however, a fundamental assumption underlying the 
Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) index that assumes horizontal equity (equal 
treatment of equals) or in other words individuals with the same income levels are 
assumed to contribute the same amount to finance the health care (Ichoku, 2006).  
But this raise a question of how practical is it in real world. Definitely, this can be 
argued to be a plausible assumption because in practice households at the same 
level of income may vary when financing their health care because of the 
randomness nature of the illness. Therefore, horizontal inequity is more likely to be 
the norm rather than an exception (Ichoku, 2006). 
Indeed, the Reynolds & Smolensky, (1977) index has further exposed another 
weakness of not taking into account the reranking effect. For example, in many 
developing countries like Zambia it is generally known that health care payments 
may push households below a poverty line or change its income position after 
financing health care. Thus, this reranking effect can result in households having 




in certain circumstances be regarded as more damaging and discriminatory than 
even the vertical inequity. It thus deserves no less attention than vertical equity.  
Hence, this calls for the inclusion of these three components (vertical, horizontal and 
reranking). Unfortunately, however, Reynolds & Smolensky, (1977) is based on the 
assumption of no horizontal and reranking effect in the transition from the pre to post 
payment income (Wagstaff & Doorslaer, 2001). For this reasons, it requires to look 
for an approach that decomposes the redistributive effect into these three 
components (vertical, horizontal and reranking). Therefore, models decomposing the 
income redistributive effect of finance systems into vertical and horizontal effects 
such as Aronson, Johnson & Lambert, (1994) and Duclos, Jalbert & Araar, (2003) 
models are extensively used. 
7. Empirical evidence on income redistributive effect in health care financing 
Empirical studies that have been undertaken to assess income redistributive effect of 
health care financing have been mainly conducted in developed countries. The initial 
study was conducted in 1997 in Netherland (Van Doorslaer et al., 1999; Gerdtham & 
Sundberg, 1998; Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 1997), second in 1998 for Sweden (Van 
Doorslaer et al., 1999; Gerdtham & Sundberg, 1998; Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 
1997). From that time, only a few more studies have been conducted and these have 
been concentrated within the developed countries (Bilger, 2008; Van Doorslaer et 
al., 1999) or selected countries in Asia (Cavagnero & Bilger, 2010; Wagstaff & Van 
Doorslaer, 2001). Furthermore, most of the empirical studies on equity in health care 
financing have been conducted in the developed and middle-income countries 
whose health systems are financed by a mixture of two or more of the health care 




Nigeria (Ichoku, 2006) (as referenced in Ataguba, 2012) and recently in South Africa 
(Ataguba, 2012). In addition, empirical evidence about equity implications of the 
existing health care financing mechanisms in developing countries remains 
comparatively sparse (Cissé, Luchini & Moatti, 2007). 
Literature in this section is thus organised according to the following themes: nature 
of the income redistributive effect of OOP payments for health care, nature of 
redistributive effect of general tax and overall pattern of redistributive effect of health 
care financing, and the implications of redistributive effect for pursuing universal 
health coverage.   
7.1  Income redistributive effect of OOP payments for health care  
OOP payments can be categorized into four; user fees paid directly to health care 
providers in  public health care facilities; co-payments made by members of a health 
insurance scheme, which reimburses only a portion of the cost of health service paid 
by a member (McIntyre, Gilson & Mutyambizi, 2005) under the table (unofficial) 
payments made as a so called gift; and finally, in some instances as  precondition for  
service to health care providers (McIntyre, Gilson & Mutyambizi, 2005). OOP 
payments are typically perceived to be the most regressive instrument of health care 
finance (O’Donnell et al., 2008).This is partly related to the fact that those with the 
lowest income levels tend to bear the greatest burden of ill-health and thus bear the 
greatest financing burden as payment is directly linked to use of health services.   
Since OOP payments are made at the point of health service utilization, households 
and individuals are therefore not protected from the unexpected burden of health 
care costs. As a result, there is no risk pooling with such payments—the entire 




situation poses major challenges for equity and financial protection of households 
(McIntyre, 2012; Kutzin, 2001). OOP payments tend to place a disproportionately 
higher burden on the poorer households than the rich income earners (Cissé, Luchini 
& Moatti, 2007). 
With respect to its impacts on equity, OOP payments are said to be associated with 
negative income redistribution (Ataguba, 2012).  Most of the equity studies in health 
care financing have shown that  OOP payment is the most regressive (pro rich) of all  
the forms of health care financing mechanisms because of the connection with 
utilization of health services (Ataguba,2012; O'Donnell & Wagstaff, 2008; Leive & Xu, 
2008; Cissé, Luchini & Moatti, 2007; Van Doorslaer et al., 1999). 
Wagstaff and Doorslaer, (2001) for example found that in Vietnam (in 1993) the 
regressive vertical effect induced by OOP payments accounted for 47 percent of 
total income redistribution while in South Africa, Ataguba (2012) found that OOP 
payments were pro rich and vertical component accounted for about 51 percent of 
income redistribution induced by OOP payments. These results are however similar 
to those obtained from Palestine (West Bank) where in 2004 regressive vertical 
effect  accounted for  43 percent of the total income redistribution (Abu-Zaineh et al., 
2009). 
In the case of South Africa, Ataguba (2012) found that even though OOP payments 
make up about 14 percent of total health care financing, the pro rich redistribution 
induced is not equitable and would reduce the extent to which overall health care 
financing redistributes income. While evidence from other studies, particularly, those 
conducted in low and middle income countries suggests that OOP payments can be 




services, rarely use these services (O'Donnell & Wagstaff, 2008). In this regard, 
McIntyre, (2007) has observed that progressivity can be argued as misleading since 
it refers to equitable financing and yet inequitable access to health care services. 
A recent comparative study of health care financing conducted by the EQUITAP 
(2005) in Asian countries revealed that OOP payments were concentrated among 
the higher income groups. For example, the highest income earners contributed 
more than half of OOP payments in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Philippines and Thailand. 
In these countries, the poor did not only pay less in absolute terms but also less as a 
proportion of household resources (O’Donnell et al., 2008).  
Some of the factors contributing to this scenario are that OOP payments in these 
countries are for the private health care, which is mainly used by the rich and even 
though there are charges at the public health facilities, that are very modest and the 
poor are exempted. While in some countries where social health insurance exists, 
most of OOP payments are linked to co-payments which are evenly spread across 
the population (O’Donnell et al., 2008). However, contrary to the principle of equity of 
paying according to ability to pay and benefits distributed according to need, the rich 
despite paying more than the poor in these countries, benefited more than the poor 
from the health services. 
Interestingly, however, some studies have reported negative redistribution with out of 
pocket payments and yet with a progressive vertical effect (Cavagnero & Bilger, 
2010). In such countries, the combination of horizontal and reranking effects 
dominates the progressive vertical effect. In Argentina (in 1997), for instance, about 
182 percent of the reduction in redistributive power of out of pocket payment is 




reranking(Cavagnero & Bilger, 2010).  In Argentina (in 2002) out of pocket payments 
were however found to be progressive and redistribute income favourably towards 
the poor. The general negative redistribution associated with out of pocket payments 
thus points to the inequitable nature of such payments. Even when they turn out to 
have a progressive vertical effect, it is a result of the exclusion faced by the poor on 
the grounds that they cannot afford the cost of treatment (Ataguba, 2012). 
van Doorslaer et al., (1999) noted that for out of pocket payments there is a relatively 
large gap between the actual and baseline redistributive effect. In this case, the gap 
is not only due to the random nature of illness, but is also probably as a result of 
variation in liability for co-payments at each income level. This variation may not only 
reflect differences in private insurance coverage but also differences in public 
coverage, due, for example, to variations across localities in co-payments rules, to 
exemptions from prescription charges.   
Although there are situations where out of pocket payments result in substantial 
differential treatment, in general, most studies show that the vertical effect 
substantially dominates the horizontal and reranking effects (Ataguba, 2012). For 
example, the study in the Netherlands indicates that the vertical effect accounts for 
about 82 percent of the negative redistribution associated with out of pocket 
expenditures (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 1997) while in Switzerland (Bilger, 2008) 
reports that the vertical effect accounts for 78 percent of the negative redistribution 
resulting from out of pocket payments. 
7.2  Nature of the income redistributive effect of general taxes  
Generally, public funds are derived mainly from general tax revenues such as direct 




custom duties) and other specific taxes (such as levies, grants and other transfers 
from individuals to the government). Other forms of funds also include donor funding  
which can take the form of loans which have to be repaid along with interest charges 
or aid grants (budget support) which do not have to be repaid (Al-Duaj, 
2009;Mclntyre,2007).The extent of equity within these health care systems is 
however dependent on several other factors such as the mix in general tax (direct 
and indirect taxes) and specific taxes; other public revenue sources and the type of 
external assistance received (Gottret & Schieber, 2006). 
With respect to taxes, direct income tax has generally been found to be progressive. 
This is particularly so because of the tax rates which are mainly structured 
progressively in many countries. Although direct taxes such as personal income tax 
tend to be progressive, the extent of pro poor redistribution varies significantly 
between countries depending on the nature of the structure of and rates of the tax. In 
addition, direct tax depends on the proportion of the population falling within each 
taxable income stratum (Ataguba, 2012).  In all the countries where studies have 
been conducted and reported, the redistributive effect was positive (in a review by 
Ataguba, 2012).  
Although direct taxes such as personal income tax (PIT) tend to be progressive, the 
extent of pro poor redistribution varies significantly between countries depending on 
the nature of the structure of and rates of the tax. In addition, direct tax depends on 
the proportion of the population falling within each taxable income stratum (Wagstaff 
et al., 1999). For example, in South Africa the redistributive effect of direct taxes was 
pro poor with the vertical effect dominating (Ataguba.2012). While, in Argentina, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, 




progressive and the contribution of the vertical effect to overall redistribution ranged 
between 100 percent and 143 percent (Ataguba,2012).  
In low income countries such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka the poorest 20 percent of 
households make virtually no contribution to direct taxes and the richest fifth percent 
contribute more than 90 percent of the direct tax revenue (O’Donnell et al., 2008). 
Certainly, this makes the direct taxes of these countries more pro poor (progressive) 
than in China where direct tax paid by the poorest fifth of households is significant 
due to an agricultural tax which is concentrated on the poor that outweighs the effect 
of PIT paid mainly by the better off  (O’Donnell et al., 2008). 
Therefore, the positive redistribution usually associated with financing health care 
through direct taxes is mainly the result of progressive direct taxes. For instance, in 
the case of Portugal, the reported differential treatment (horizontal inequity and 
reranking) is linked to differences in tax structure between wage earners and the 
self-employed such that individuals that earn a similar income end up making 
differential tax payments (van Doorslaer et al., 1999). Whereas, in countries such as 
Denmark, Sweden and the United States, differential treatments, though small, were 
attributed to geographical/regional differences in tax structure (van Doorslaer et al., 
1999). While, in other countries such as Germany, Italy and Ireland the pro poor 
vertical effect accounts for all of the redistribution because there were no significant 
differential treatments (van Doorslaer et al., 1999). 
While direct taxes have shown to reduce income inequality, indirect taxes on the 
other hand have been shown to worsen inequality in income. Most studies have 
shown that health care financing through indirect taxes increases income inequality. 




effect. Ataguba (2012), for instance, in his study on distributional impact of health 
care finance in South Africa found that the redistributive effect associated with 
financing health care using indirect taxes increases income inequality. This is 
consistent with  other studies conducted in other countries such as Portugal (in 
1990), Argentina (in 2002), Italy (in 1991), and United Kingdom (in 1992) where the 
income redistributive effect of health care financing through indirect taxes increases 
income inequality  (Cavagnero & Bilger, 2010; Van Doorslaer et al., 1999).  
Even though, indirect taxes are generally regressive as they are usually levied at a 
flat rate and result in lower income earners paying a higher proportion of their 
incomes than the higher income earners (Wagstaff et al., 1999), in certain 
circumstances, particularly, in low and middle income countries such as Thailand 
and Nepal, they have been found to be slightly progressive due to the exemption of 
basic foodstuffs from VAT, thereby protecting the poor from paying for these 
taxes(O’Donnell et al., 2008). 
So, what are the factors contributing to the increases in income inequality through 
indirect taxes? The major drivers of the negative redistribution associated with 
indirect taxes have been attributed to the vertical effect (Ataguba, 2012). However, in 
some countries like Netherland, Sweden, Italy, Germany, Switzerland and Denmark 
the pro rich vertical effect accounts for all the negative income redistribution 
(Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 1997). 
Bringing together the direct and indirect taxes, general taxes tend to be a pro poor 
(progressive) financing mechanism (Ataguba, 2012). For example, in Denmark (in 
1987) and in Switzerland (in 1992) the redistributive effect of general taxes was pro 




associated with general taxes dominates the horizontal and reranking effects 
(Ataguba, 2012).  
However, the level of progressivity of general tax depends to a large extent on the 
progressivity of its components (direct and indirect taxes) and their relative share of 
total tax revenue (van Doorslaer et al., 1999). Therefore, if direct tax which is often 
typically progressive forms a large component of overall tax, then general tax can be 
pro poor (progressive). By contrast, if indirect taxes which tend to be regressive are 
given stronger emphasis in the overall tax system then tax incidence can be pro rich 
(regressive) (Ataguba, 2012). 
7.3  Overall pattern of income redistributive effect of health care financing  
The redistribution associated with total health care financing (public health care 
financing and private health care financing) varies depending on the relative 
importance of each health care mechanism and their relative vertical, horizontal and 
reranking effects. For example, the redistributive effect associated with public 
financing sources is mixed across the twelve (12) OECD countries (van Doorslaer et 
al., 1999).   
While Germany, Netherlands, and Switzerland record pro poor redistribution, the rest 
of the countries show pro poor redistribution and these are again largely attributed to 
the vertical effect. Nevertheless, the combination of all the private health care 
financing sources, on average, induced pro rich redistribution in all except in 
Netherlands of the OECD countries. This pro poor redistribution in the  Netherlands 
is attributed to the pro poor redistribution in the private insurance that dominates the 




By and large, many countries record negative income redistribution for overall health 
care financing which is caused mainly by regressive vertical effects. These countries, 
for example, include Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Palestine, Portugal, 
Switzerland and the United States (Abu-Zaineh et al., 2009; Bilger, 2008; van 
Doorslaer et al., 1999; Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 1997; Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 
1997).  
Typically, the pro rich redistribution of health care financing is attributed to a 
regressive vertical effect in indirect taxes. But, to a lesser extent, this pro rich 
redistributive effect could also be associated with the consumption patterns that exist 
among households with similar incomes. In the case of Portugal, for example, 
differential treatment was associated with multiple value added tax (VAT) rates on 
different goods and services (van Doorslaer et al., 1999). However, a few countries 
such as Argentina, France, Italy, South Africa and Sweden (Cavagnero & Bilger, 
2010; van Doorslaer et al., 1999) have recorded a positive income redistributive 
effect with overall health care financing.  
In summary, the overall pattern of income redistributive effect of health care 
financing depends largely on the structure and relative share of the various forms of 
health care financing mechanisms (e.g. general tax, OOP) in the overall tax system. 
If general taxes, for example, which is often typically progressive (pro poor) forms a 
large component of overall health care financing, then the overall health care 
financing may be pro poor (or progressive) thereby reducing income inequality. By 
contrast, if OOP which tends to be regressive (or pro rich), is given stronger 
emphasis in the overall health care financing system then financing incidence can be 




8.  Summary of the literature review 
It has been revealed that equity is a difficult concept to define and yet remains a very 
critical policy goal. Overall, empirical evidence on alternative financial contribution 
mechanisms shows that OOP payments are the most pro rich (regressive) or as 
minimum, the least pro rich (progressive), particularly, if the poorest do not use the 
health services because they are required to pay for these services. While general 
taxes are usually the most pro poor (progressive) forms of health care financing 
mechanisms. 
Internationally, there is a general consensus to reduce a country’s reliance on OOP 
payments and efforts are made to promote alternative health care financing (pre-
payment) that would provide financial risk protection against catastrophic health 
payment. While there are competing methodologies for evaluating the income 
redistributive effect of health care financing, this review shows that there are very 
few studies that have assessed income redistribution of health care financing in 
developing countries, particularly in Africa.  
Even though there is considerable amount of theoretical literature on equity in health 
care financing, no study has attempted to look at the income redistributive effect of 
public finance (general tax) and OOP payments for health care in Zambia. Most 
studies on health care financing in Zambia have focused on describing distributions 
of health care financing by socioeconomic groups, using simple tabulations and 
summary indices as opposed to decomposition approaches. This study will therefore 
fill this gap by moving beyond these summary measures of assessing equity in 
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Background: Internationally, there is a debate on the need to promote a progressive 
and an equitable health care financing system. However, many African countries still 
do not have equitable health systems. The current discussion on countries moving 
toward universal health coverage, however, requires an understanding of the impact 
on income inequality of the prevailing health care financing mechanisms. An 
investigation of the overall income redistributive effect of health care financing thus 
requires assessing health care financing in relation to the principles of contributing to 
financing health care according to ability to pay. Zambia is currently considering 
major health systems reforms toward a universal health system. This paper 
investigates the overall pattern of income redistributive effect of two broad existing 
health care financing mechanisms in Zambia – general taxes and out of pocket 
payments. 
Method: Cross sectional analysis was performed using the 2010 nationally 
representative Zambian Living Condition and Monitoring Survey dataset with a 
sample size of 19,397 households. A standard procedure was used to decompose 
income redistribution associated with health care financing into vertical, horizontal 
and reranking components. Redistributive effect of each finance mechanism and the 
overall health care financing system were assessed.  
Results: Financing health care in Zambia through direct taxes, general taxes and 
out of pocket payments induce pro rich income redistribution estimated at -0.0049, -
0.0039, and -0.0067 respectively while indirect taxes induce pro poor income 
redistribution estimated at 0.0011. Overall health care financing induces positive 
income redistributive effect estimated at 0.0004. In all cases, except for the total 
health care financing and indirect taxes, the combined effects of the horizontal and 
reranking components dominate the vertical effect. 
Conclusion: This paper reports that overall, health care financing redistributes 
incomes from the rich to the poor in Zambia. However, this is not the case for some 
individual mechanisms such as direct taxes and out of pocket payments. The 
findings in this paper should help shape policy toward ensuring an equitable and 
efficient health care financing system in Zambia. 
 
Keywords: health care financing; redistributive effect; progressivity; horizontal 







Key points for decision makers 
 Paying for health care in Zambia places a heavier burden on the rich relative 
to the poor. It also improves income inequality.  
 Although, total health care financing reduces income inequality, some sources 
of health care financing like out of pocket payments and direct taxes increase 
income inequality. 
 One possible way to improve the current income inequality of some individual 
sources of health care financing would be to pay attention to those that 
worsen income inequality in Zambia. 
 Increasing the number of income tax thresholds than what is currently in 
existence in Zambia could improve income inequality associated with paying 
for health care through direct taxes. This is because, with more categories, 
one can discriminate, more favourably, between the rich and the poor more.  
 Out of pocket payments should form a relatively small share of total health 
care financing in Zambia because such payments are regarded as unfair and 
they contribute to an increase in income inequality.  
 
1.  Introduction 
Equity in financing of health care is a subject of major concern particularly in 
developing countries. The current focus of the international debate is on the need to 
move away from excessive reliance on out of pocket (OOP) payment as a source of 
health financing towards a system which incorporates a greater element of risk 
pooling and thus affords greater protection for the poor [1]. Zambia, a developing 
country struggling with income inequalities and poor progress toward achieving 
universal health coverage, is no exception. In this regard, Zambia intends to carry 
out health reforms. The proposed social health insurance scheme for Zambia aims to 
achieve a universal health system. However, the best way to identify the health care 
financing mechanism that is best suited to achieving this goal is to consider 
international evidence on funding in universal health systems [2]. 
In Zambia, health care system is financed through a mix of various sources of health 
care financing mechanisms (e.g. general tax, out of pocket (OOP), donors and 
private insurance contributions). The main health care financing sources in Zambia 




However, the public funding dominates other health care financing mechanisms [3].  
Zambia spends 6.2 per cent (2009) of its gross domestic product (GDP) on health 
[4].  This is similar to the spending levels in other lower middle-income countries in 
Africa, which spent an average of 5.8 per cent (2009) of their GDP on health (e.g. 
Angola, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Swaziland, and Sudan) [5].  
Government spending on health has however increased slightly over time as a 
percentage of the total government budget.  In 2010, for instance, 16.4 per cent of 
Zambia’s total government expenditures were spent on health, up from 14.7 percent 
and 15.7 percent in 2005 and 2009 respectively [4, 5].  Government also accounts 
for 60 per cent of total health expenditures while OOP expenditures only accounts 
for 26.3 per cent of total health expenditures in 2010 [4].  Although government 
health expenditure as a proportion of total government expenditure has significantly 
increased, it is still way below the Abuja declaration target of 15 percent of 
government health expenditure as a share of total government expenditure [5].  One 
of the major challenges facing Zambia today is to reduce income inequality and 
poverty among the population. Despite the recent turnaround in the economy as 
shown by real GDP growth of more than 5 per cent, the majority of Zambians 
continue to live in poverty [6].  Income inequality remained high. In 2010, for 
example, the Gini coefficient was estimated at 0.66 compared to 0.55 in 2006 [5, 6], 
implying that income inequality has increased. 
The situation is further compounded by the inequalities and inequities in the 
distribution of wealth and socioeconomic infrastructure across the country, which 
currently favours the urban areas and adversely impacts on the provision of social 
services such as health in rural hard to reach areas [6].  Poverty also continues to be 




and 68 percent living under the national poverty line in 2010. Rural poverty is equally 
a major problem with 78 percent of the rural population currently living below the 
poverty line compared to 28 percent for the urban population [6].   
Since financing health care impacts on income distribution in a country, it is generally 
accepted that a pro poor (or progressive) health care financing system that places 
less  burden on the poor than on the rich, is preferred to a pro rich (or regressive) 
one [7].  This is because regressive health care financing is usually regarded as 
inequitable [8] and unfair. Thus, it is expected that a good financing system 
contributes to the overall reduction in income inequality through a pro poor income 
redistributive process [7].   
Although the assessments of progressivity and redistributive effect of a tax system 
have long attracted the attention of researchers [9], measuring the overall impact of 
health care financing on income distribution is a relatively new area of analysis in the 
context of developing countries [8]. Recent empirical evidence mainly from 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and a 
number of middle income countries has already indicated that different health care 
financing mechanisms may differently affect the prevailing income distribution of a 
country and, consequently, the associated degree of overall income inequality [10]. 
This paper presents the assessment of income redistributive effect of two broad 
health care financing mechanisms (general tax and out of pocket payments) using 
the Aronson et al. [17] model. The paper decomposes the income redistributive 
effect of each of the two broad health care financing mechanisms into the vertical, 
horizontal and reranking components. This paper is organized as follows; the next 




methods, empirical results on income redistributive effect for the health care 
financing mechanisms follow.  The penultimate section discusses the redistributive 
effect, and compares it with other studies. The last section draws the conclusions. 
2.  Methods 
2.1  Data 
This study draws on secondary data from the latest 2010 Zambian Living Condition 
Monitoring Survey (LCMS), which is commonly known as Indicator Monitoring 
Survey (IMS). LCMS is a nationally representative household survey designed to 
provide household level data for the evaluation of various government policies on the 
living conditions of the Zambian population [6]. The survey was conducted by Central 
Statistical Office between January and April 2010 and it used a two staged stratified 
cluster sampling strategy [28]. The first stage involved the selection of one thousand 
(1000) Standard Enumeration Areas (SEAs) with Probability Proportion to Size 
(PPSs) [28]. Subsequently, approximately twenty thousands (20,000) households 
are systematically selected across the SEAs, which comprised both rural and urban 
locations and the nine (9) provinces. With a household response rate of 98 percent 
[6], the complete dataset contains a total sample size of 19,397 households (i.e. 
102,882 individuals) [28]. In terms of the content, the 2010 LCMS contains 
information about households’ socio-demographic characteristics including, health, 
economic activities, gross monthly income and expenditures [6]. The study linked 
health care payments to social economic status within household to determine the 
burden of health care payments.  
2.2  Measuring ability to pay 
There are many alternative approaches for measuring household living standard or 




or a composite index of social economic status. However, each measure presents 
both practical and conceptual challenges and there appears to be no “best” measure 
to use [11]. Given the lack of well organised labour markets and a high variability of 
income in a developing country context [12] such as Zambia, this paper uses annual 
household consumption expenditure as a proxy for income.  This is defined as the 
final use of goods and services excluding the intermediate use of goods and services 
in the production of others [11].  
Household consumption expenditure is a better measure than income particularly in 
developing countries with a large informal sector because of its smoothing effect 
which reflects long term average wellbeing and it is less understated than income 
[13].   
The construction of the household consumption expenditure was based on the 
household reported expenditure and consumption of food (frequently purchased), 
housing and other non-food items (less frequently purchased). Moreover, the 
measure takes into account consumption from other sources than purchases from 
the market. This means that consumption of own production, transfers received in 
kind from any source, imputed rents from owner occupied housing unit were all 
considered in measuring the household consumption expenditure. Per capita income 
was computed based on total household consumption expenditure by dividing by the 
household size.  
2.3  Computation of health care payments 
Health care payments were computed for two broad health care financing 
mechanisms; general taxes and out of pocket payments. For each mechanism, a 




health care financing burden studies [11].  In the case of taxes, only the proportion of 
tax revenue that is allocated to the health sector (8.2 percent) in 2010 [14] was 
considered. The following tax categories were then considered; personal income tax, 
corporate income tax, value added tax, fuel levy and excise tax. For corporate 
income tax, however, there is no consensus in the literature as to how to extract it in 
terms of who bears the final burden [15]. It is generally assumed that shareholders 
and consumers bear the burden of the tax through lower profits and higher prices on 
goods and services respectively [15]. In this study, it is assumed that the burden of 
corporate tax is shared equally (50% / 50%) between consumers and shareholders. 
Out of pocket (OOP) payments included costs of medicines, fees to medical 
personnel (e.g. doctors / medical assistant / nurses / dentist, etc.) and payments to 
hospital/health centre/surgery. Expenditures on health related transportation were 
nevertheless excluded.  In this study, total taxes and out of pocket (OOP) payments 
for each household were adjusted by household size to generate per capita 
estimates. Income tax was calculated from reported income and indirect taxes from 
reported expenditure of taxed items. Table 3 shows the computation of health care 
payments in Zambia.   
2.4  Decomposing income redistributive effect of health care financing 
One way of measuring the redistributive effect of any payment on the distribution of 
incomes is to compare the inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient of pre-
payment income with the inequality in post-payment incomes [11]. There are 
however different ways of decomposing and measuring the redistributive effect.  This 
includes the Duclos, Jalbert and Araar [16] model and Aronson, Johnson and 
Lambert [17] model. This paper adopts the most popular approach i.e., the Aronson, 




The AJL model demonstrated that redistributive effect can be decomposed into three 
components; progressivity effect, horizontal equity and re-ranking effects [18]. Here, 
redistribution through progressivity in the relationship between payments and ATP 
can be distinguished from that due to the unequal treatment of equals, and that due 
to health payments that change the position of individuals or groups in the post 
payments distribution of income [9].  
Redistributive effect can be defined as the change in the Gini coefficient caused by 
the payment. Hence,  
RE = GX - GX-P ………………………………………………………………………….. (1) 
where GX and GX-P are the pre-payment and post-payment Gini coefficients 
respectively.  X denotes per capita pre-payment income, and P denotes the payment 
[11, 18]. It is likely that individuals change ranking as a result of payments and 
different people at the same pre-payment income end up paying dramatically 
different amounts of their income toward health care. As the tax literature shows, the 
total redistributive effect in such cases ought to be computed as the difference 
between a vertical equity component attributable to the degree to which, on average, 
payments are progressive, and the combined effect of a horizontal equity and a 
reranking [18]. Aronson, Johnson and Lambert [17] showed that equation (1) can be 
written as; 
RE= V – H – R …………………………………………………………………….   (2) 
where V is vertical income redistribution which according to Bilger [19] measures the 
extent to which a financing mechanism or system is pro poor or pro rich in the 




is the degree of reranking defined as a change in the order of income distribution 
[18]. H and R effects are not expected to be negative [7]. However, one implication is 
that payments could be proportional to ATP on average (i.e., V = 0), and yet 
payments could produce redistributive effect because H and R are non-zero 
(households at a given level of ATP pay different amounts on health care) [18]. 
The vertical redistribution component which represents the redistribution that would 
arise if there were horizontal equity in payment can then be defined as;  
V = GX – G0 ……………………………………………………………………………. (3) 
where G0 is the between groups3 Gini coefficient for post payment income. This can 
be computed by replacing all post payments incomes with their group means. 
However, V effect can further be decomposed into two components: a payment rate 
effect and a progressivity effect [17] as indicated in equation (4). 
V = K…………………………………………………………………………… (4) 
where g is the sample average payment rate (as a proportion of income) and K is the 
Kakwani index of payment that would arise if there were horizontal equity in health 
care payments. It is computed as the difference between the between groups 
concentration index for payments and GX [7]. 
Horizontal inequity (H) is measured as:  
H = ∑jαj GjX – P………………………………………………………………………… (5) 
                                                          
3
These are close rather than the exact equal groups artificially created because of the sparsity or absence of exact 
equals in typical sample data. In this case, analyst needs to use bands to allocate income units to households or 
individuals with similar ability to pay (income).  Although in this context the choice of income intervals or 
bandwidth is of critical importance, such a choice does not affect the measure of (H + R) per se but only their 




Where αj, is the product of each group’s population share and its post payments 
income share and GjX – P is the weighted sum of the group (j) specific post payment 
income Gini coefficient. Since the Gini coefficient for each group of payments is 
nonnegative, H is also nonnegative and any horizontal inequity (H) can only reduce 
redistribution, but not increase it. This simply implies that any horizontal inequity will 
always make a post payment distribution of incomes more unequal than it would 
have been in its absence [7].  
Reranking (R) shows the extent of reranking of households that occurs in the move 
from the prepayment to the post payment distribution of income [7]. It is measured as 
 R = GX−P − CX−P ………………………………………………………………………… (6) 
where CX−P is a post payment income concentration index that is obtained by initially 
ranking households by their prepayment incomes and then, within each group of 
prepayment “equals,” by their post payment income.  R cannot be negative because 
the concentration curve of post payment income cannot lie below the Lorenz curve of 
post payment income. If the two curves coincide (and the two indices are equal), 
then no reranking occurs [7].  In summary, total redistributive effect can be 
decomposed into four components: an average rate effect (g), the departure-from-
proportionality or progressivity effect (K), a horizontal inequity effect (H), and a 
reranking effect (R) [11].  
But, practical application of the AJL model requires an arbitrary choice of income 
intervals to define “equals” in order to be able to distinguish and compute V, H and R 
components [7]. Because of the absence of “exact income of equals” in real surveys 
data, equals are obtained by defining certain pre-payment income intervals, and then 




“close income equals” [17] divides the study sample into artificial groups of income 
based on certain definitions of income bandwidths [18]. The choice of bandwidth 
inevitably affects the computed values of H and R individually. Specifically, as the 
bandwidth is narrowed, H falls and R rises. However, their sum (H + R) does not 
change [18, 20].  
Arbitrary specification of the bandwidth has however been considered as one of the 
limitations of the AJL method. Urban  and Lambert [20], for instance, argue that such 
practice can lead to misleading results because of the possibility of both intra groups 
reranking (i.e. the extent to which the payments schedule induces changes in 
ranking order of individuals within the specified groups of close income equals) and 
the entire groups reranking (i.e. the extent to which the payment schedule induces 
changes in ranking order of the whole groups of close income equals which also is 
dependent on the size of the chosen income bands, and thus arbitrary in a normative 
context).  
Despite these constraints, the Aronson, Johnson and Lambert [17] model has been 
extensively applied in health care financing. This model, for example, was applied in 
the Netherlands [21], in Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, United States, Switzerland, 
Denmark and Finland [22] and in South Korea [23]. In Africa the model has been 
used in South Africa [7] and in Nigeria [24]. However, to the knowledge of the author, 
no study has applied the AJL model in the context of Zambia, a low middle-income 
country in the sub Saharan region where income inequality is high.  
3.  Empirical results 
Table 2 shows the income redistribution of health care financing in Zambia, along 




care in Zambia through direct taxes is pro rich implying that direct tax increases 
income inequality. The redistributive effect was estimated at -0.0049.  This increase 
in income inequality associated with direct taxes arises from a negative effect of 
reranking and horizontal inequity that dominates the positive vertical effect. The 
vertical effect associated with direct taxes is estimated at 0.0024. This vertical effect 
is however smaller than the combined effects of horizontal inequity and reranking 
estimated at 0.0004 and 0.0069 respectively. This implies that unequal households 
are treated unequally and equal households end up being treated unequally in 
contributing to direct taxes while some households are reranked in the redistributive 
process. 
Table1: AJL decomposition of income redistributive effect of health care payments, Zambia 2010 
Finance source V H R RE 
Direct taxes 0.237862 0.037179 0.693166 -0.492483 
Indirect taxes 0.13023 0.004722 0.011466 0.114042 
General taxes 0.374677 0.043716 0.718275 -0.387314 
Out of pocket payments 0.429742 0.115798 0.982467 -0.668523 
Total health care payments 0.065039 0.006951 0.02167 0.036418 
Note: All figures are multiplied by 100 to enhance readability 
Unlike direct taxes, financing health care through indirect taxes in form of value 
added tax, fuel levy and excise taxes induce a pro poor income redistributive effect 
(decrease income inequality) as indicated in table 1.  The pro poor income 
redistributive effect associated with indirect taxes was estimated at 0.0011 meaning 
that financing health care in Zambia through indirect taxes reduces income 
inequality. The vertical effect was estimated at 0.0013 which dominates both the 
horizontal inequity estimated at 0.00005 and reranking effect estimated at 0.0001. 




end up being treated unequally in contributing to indirect taxes while some 
households were reranked in redistributive process.  
Bringing together direct taxes and indirect taxes, table 2 shows that financing health 
care through general taxes in Zambia induces pro rich income redistribution. The 
redistributive effect associated with general taxes is estimated at -0.0039 meaning 
that general taxes redistribute income in favour of the rich.  The vertical effect is 
estimated at 0.0037 while horizontal inequity and reranking are estimated at 0.0004 
and 0.0072 respectively, indicating that unequal households are treated unequally 
and equal households end up being treated unequally in contributing to general 
taxes while some households were reranked in the redistributive process. The 
vertical effect associated with general taxes is however smaller than the combined 
effects of reranking and horizontal inequity. This pro rich income redistributive effect 
associated with general taxes is as a result of the pro rich income redistributive effect 
associated with direct taxes estimated at -0.0049 which offset the pro poor income 
redistributive effect attributed to indirect taxes estimated at 0.0011. 
Out of pocket payments also increase income inequality in Zambia as indicated in 
table 1.  The redistributive effect was estimated at -0.0067 implying that OOP 
payments favour the rich relative to the poor. The vertical effect was estimated at 
0.0043 which is smaller than the combined effects of horizontal inequity and 
reranking estimated at 0.0012 and 0.0098 respectively.  This implies that unequal 
households are treated unequally and equal households end up being treated 
unequally while some households were reranked in the redistributive process.  In the 
case of out of pocket payments in Zambia, it can be argued that the income 




access barriers to health services that individuals and households in particular the 
poor are faced with. 
Overall, health care financing in Zambia is pro poor in redistributing income. The 
overall income redistributive effect was estimated at 0.0004. In this case, the vertical 
effect was estimated at 0.0007. This shows the degree to which income inequality 
decreases due to the unequal treatments of unequals. On the other hand, horizontal 
inequity and reranking were estimated at 0.00007 and 0.0002 respectively implying 
that equal households end up being treated unequally while some households were 
reranked in the redistributive process. The decrease in income inequality in the 
overall health care financing arises from the dominant effect of general taxes over 
OOP payments. 
Table 2: Percentage decomposition of redistributive effect of Zambian health care financing, 2010 








RE 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
V - 48.3% 114.2% -96.7% -64.3% 165.8% 
H -7.5% 4.1% -11.3% -17.3% 19.1% 
R  - 140.7% 10.1% -185.4% -147.0% 59.5% 
 
Contributions of vertical effect (V), horizontal equity (H) and reranking (R) to the 
overall redistributive effect may be better reflected by expressing them as a 
percentage of the redistributive effect [21]. These are shown in table 3. Here, direct 
taxes would have been 148.2% less pro rich in the absence of differential treatment.  
Majority of this differential treatment is attributed to reranking 140.7% while 7.5% is 
caused by horizontal inequity. For indirect taxes, the increase in income 




the absence of differential treatment. Of this 10.1% is associated with reranking and 
4.1% is due to horizontal inequity. As table 3 shows, general taxes would have been 
196.7% less pro rich in the absence of differential treatments. The major source of 
this effect comes from reranking 185.4% while 11.3% comes from horizontal 
inequity. 
Out of pocket payments also show a fairly high level of differential treatment. The 
increase in income inequality would have been 164.3% lesser in the absence of 
differential treatment. Reranking alone accounts for about 147.0% of this effect and 
horizontal inequity accounts for 17.3%.  
As depicted in table 2, overall health care financing induces a pro poor income 
redistribution effect in Zambia. The decrease in income inequality would have been 
78.6% more in the absence of differential treatment. Reranking alone accounts for 
59.5% and horizontal inequity accounts for 19.1%.  
4.  Discussion 
In many developed and developing countries the promotion of a progressive and 
equitable health care financing system is an important goal [7]. This study 
decomposes health care financing in Zambia into vertical effect (V), horizontal equity 
effect (H) and reranking (R).  Using the AJL model, this study has revealed that 
financing health care through direct taxes is progressive and yet increases income 
inequality. The redistributive effect is estimated at -0.0049, vertical effect estimated 
at 0.0024 and the combined effect of the differential treatments estimated at 0.0073.  
The differential treatments (H and R) associated with direct taxes in Zambia 




are a number of institutional factors that are likely to give rise to non-zero values of H 
and R. In the case of Zambia, the non-zero values of H and R can be associated 
with some forms of income exemptions from income tax that exist in Zambia. Non-
zero values of H and R can also be attributed to some forms of expenditures like 
dividends payments which are tax deductible in Zambia.  
In contrast to the findings of direct taxes in Zambia, the redistributive effect was 
positive in other countries. This includes Denmark (in1987), Germany (in 1988), 
South Africa (in 2005/06), Finland (in 1990), Argentina (in 1997), Italy (in 1991), 
Netherlands (in 1997 and 1992), Portugal (in 1990), Sweden (in 1990), Switzerland 
(in 2008), USA (in 1987) and UK (in 1992) [7, 19, 21, 22]. In all these studies, the 
vertical effect dominates the H and R effects.  
Results from countries such as Sweden, USA and Denmark, differential treatments 
were associated with regional/geographical differences in tax structure. While in 
Portugal, differential treatments were attributed to differences in tax structure 
between wage earners and the self-employed such that individuals that earns a 
similar income end up making differential tax payments [22]. 
Since direct taxes are progressive and yet induce pro rich income redistribution in 
Zambia there can still be room to address them in such a way that they become 
more progressive and pro poor income redistribution. This can be done by increasing 
the number of income tax thresholds than what is currently in existence. With more 
categories, one can discriminate between the rich and the poor more. In this study, 
the pro rich income redistribution of direct taxes could be attributed to the fact that 
although the analysis of income redistributive effect was based on the entire 




values and when they pay such tax (given the few bands), it could lead to this pro – 
rich income redistribution. 
Unlike direct taxes, indirect taxes in Zambia reduce income inequality (i.e., pro poor). 
The pro poor income redistribution of indirect taxes is attributed to the pro poor 
income redistribution of fuel levy, excise taxes and value added tax (VAT). The 
redistributive effect associated with financing health care through indirect taxes was 
estimated at 0.0011. This result is consistent with those reported in other studies. 
Results elsewhere such as China, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Korea Republic, Kyrgyz 
Republic and Nepal recorded the positive income redistributive effect estimated at 
0.00024, 0.00058, 0.00077, 0.00017, 0.00018, 0.0006 and 0.00056 respectively [25].  
While in other studies such as in Italy (in1999), Portugal (in 1990), United Kingdom 
(in 1992), Germany (in1988), Finland (in 1990), Switzerland (in 1998) and 
Netherlands (in 1987), using the AJL approach, recorded negative income 
redistributive effects estimated at -0.0014, -0.002, -0.0018, -0.0007, -0.0025, -
0.00019 and -0.0006, respectively [16,17,19] while in South Africa (in 2012) using 
the Duclos et al. (2003) approach reported  pro rich income redistributive effect 
estimated at –0.0012 (17) . In all the previous studies the vertical effect is the key 
driver of the negative redistribution associated with indirect taxes (see [7]). 
Differential treatments in health care financing in Zambia accounts for about 14.2% 
of the loss in redistributive power of indirect taxes. This can be attributed mainly to 
the non-discriminatory nature of indirect taxes, sometimes even with the 
consumption patterns that prevail among households with the same incomes. For 
indirect taxes, the values of H and R may reflect differential consumptions levels at 




commodity taxes in most countries like Zambia vary to some extent across types of 
commodity. Findings from other countries such as Tanzania and Ghana indicate that 
indirect taxes were progressive. The progressivity of indirect taxes in Ghana and 
Tanzania where linked to the wide range of VAT exemptions on products such as 
agricultural goods mainly consumed by the poor and the progressivity of imports 
duties [15, 26].   
Turning to general taxes, they induce pro rich income redistribution. The 
redistributive effect was estimated at -0.0039 with vertical effect accounting for 
0.0037. Thus, a combination of a pro rich income redistribution attributed to direct 
taxes and the pro poor income redistribution associated with indirect taxes used in 
financing health care have resulted into a pro rich income redistributive effect for the 
general taxes in Zambia.  In the case of Zambia, the pro poor vertical effect 
associated with general taxes is dominated by the sum of the horizontal and 
reranking effects.  
Since general taxes are found to be progressive and induce a pro rich income 
redistributive effect in Zambia, increased reliance on them to finance health care is 
most likely to keep overall health care financing progressive and yet induces pro rich 
income redistribution. Though general taxes are progressive and pro rich in their 
income redistribution in Zambia, there can still be space to address them in such a 
way that they become more progressive and pro poor. For instance, individual 
components of direct taxes and indirect taxes that constitute general taxes can be 
examined and structuring the marginal tax rates in such a way as to discriminate 
between different income groups. Therefore, if other health care financing 





Elsewhere including Finland (in 1990), Denmark (in 1987), Switzerland (in 1992) and 
South Africa (in 2012) the redistributive effect of general taxes was estimated at 
0.0044, 0.0024, 0.0035 and 0.0035 respectively and in all these countries the pro 
poor vertical effect dominates the horizontal and reranking effects [7,22]. In these 
countries, general taxes were pro poor in redistributing income due to a pro poor 
income redistribution of direct taxes which offsets the pro rich redistribution of 
indirect taxes [7]. 
Out of pocket payments are associated with increasing income inequality in the 
Zambian health care system.  The income redistributive effect associated with out of 
pocket payment was estimated at -0.00006. This result is similar to those obtained 
from other countries such as Vietnam (in 1998) estimated at -0.0024, South Africa (in 
2012) estimated at -0.0006, Ireland (in 1987) estimated at -0.0015 and the 
Netherlands (in 1992) estimated at -0.0005 [7,18,22]. In Zambia, although the 
direction of the impact is the same for out of pocket payments and direct taxes, the 
magnitude is not. The impact of out of pocket payments on income redistribution is 
greater. The non-zero values of horizontal inequity (H) and reranking (R) for out of 
pocket payments are mainly due to the non-discriminatory nature of such payments. 
The differential treatments associated with out of pocket payments in Zambia can 
also be attributed to the random nature of illness. In the case of South Africa, for 
example, the non-zero values of horizontal inequity and reranking were mainly due 
to the non-discriminatory nature of out of pocket payments and the stochastic nature 
of illness [7] 
Therefore, increased dependence on out of pocket payments in the overall health 
care financing in Zambia will not promote equity in health care financing as it 




pocket payments could lead to financial catastrophe or impoverishment of the 
population [27]. Thus, dependence on out of pocket payments for financing health 
care in Zambia is unlikely to lead to an improvement in the progressivity of the 
overall health care financing.  
Overall, health care financing in Zambia has shown to induce a pro poor income 
redistributive effect. This result is consistent with those reported in other studies. The 
redistributive effect associated with overall health care financing in Zambia was 
estimated at 0.0004.  Similarly, results elsewhere such as in France (in 1989), Italy 
(in 1991), Sweden (in 1990) and South Africa have generally recorded positive 
income redistribution effect for overall health care financing [7, 21, 22, 25]. However, 
in other countries such as Denmark (in 1987), Germany (in 1988), Netherlands (in 
1992 and 1997), Portugal (in 1990), Switzerland (in 1992) and United States (in 
1987) overall health care financing has been demonstrated to induce pro rich income 
redistribution [21, 22]. 
Though the analysis undertaken in this paper attempted to extend the distributional 
analysis in health care financing by decomposing and measuring income 
redistributive effect of health care financing in Zambia, it has a few limitations. 
Estimates concerning out of pocket payments were based on survey data just like in 
other similar studies on income inequality measurement in health care; they may be 
subjected to recall bias. 
Further, understanding equity in health care system can be better by considering 
both the health care financing and delivery of health services. Although, the findings 
in this study provide a useful and detailed picture of the income inequality variation 




future research in this area can benefit from looking at both sides of the health care 
system in order to provide a more comprehensive analysis of equity in health care 
system.  
5.  Conclusion 
This paper provides evidence that overall, health care financing redistributes 
incomes from the rich to the poor in Zambia. However, this is not the case for some 
individual health care financing mechanisms. Financing health care through direct 
taxes, general taxes and out of pocket payments were shown to be progressive but 
pro rich in income redistribution while indirect taxes induce pro poor income 
redistribution. In all cases, except for total health care financing and indirect taxes 
the combined effect of the horizontal and reranking effects dominates the vertical 
effect. These findings clearly indicate that the impacts of differential treatments are 
equally significant and constitute inequity in health care financing in Zambia. This 
study has also revealed that a health care financing mechanism can be progressive 
and yet lead to an increase in income inequality. The findings in this paper should 
therefore help shape policy toward ensuring an equitable and efficient health care 
financing system in Zambia. 
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Table 3 financing incidence analysis estimation techniques 
Component Incidence 
assumption 
Rates*          Basic computation technique 





0%-35% depending on 
income level. 0% tax 
for incomes below 
ZMK800,000 
(unrebased)4 .  
Apply the appropriate tax rate and tax thresholds on the gross 
taxable income (salaries and wages received, income from 
business or professional practice/activities , part of dividends and 
interest received and/or accrued on deposits) of individuals within 





35%  Apportioning the total corporate tax receipt based on Zambia 
Revenue Authority data to households based on the tax shifting 
assumptions. Assumption of tax shifting includes certain percentage 
borne by shareholders (the LCMS collected information on those 
who receive dividends) and the rest by households through 
consumption. In this study, one tax-shifting scenario was assumed; 
equal (50%/50%) tax burden was shared between consumers and 
shareholders/capital owners. 
Value added tax 
(VAT) 
Consumer 16% on standard rated 
goods and services 
The value added tax rate is applied to expenditure of goods and 
services that are standard rated excluding the zero rated and 
exempted goods. 
Excise tax Consumer 40% of retail price for 
clear beer, 
125% of retail price for 
wine, spirits, 
ZMK 145/litre for 
opaque beer, 
Apply the tax rate on the expenditure on wine, spirits, beer, 
cigarettes and soft drinks. For opaque beer, apply the rate per litre 
to the quantity of opaque beer consumed by households. 
                                                          
*This applies to the taxes and are based on the 2010 assessment year 





10% of retail price for 
soft drinks, 
145% of retail price for 
cigarettes. 
Fuel levy Consumer  ZMK 6898 /litre for 
diesel   and ZMK 
7573/litre for petrol. 
Since fuel is consumed by households (personal or public 
transportation) and corporate users, estimation involved a process 
of generating the component attributed to public transport users, 
users of private transport and those attributed to users in business. 
Others   Includes taxes on stamps duties, properties, airport departures and 
unidentified levies.  
Out of pocket 
(OOP) payments 
Payer  Comprehensive household expenditure on medicines consultations, 
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Financing health care and its impact on income inequality in Zambia  
Key messages 
 Total health care financing in Zambia contributes to a reduction in income 
inequality by benefiting the poor 
 Richer Zambians devote more share of their income to financing health care 
compared to the poor. 
 Financing health care overall can be described as relatively fair to the poorer 
Zambians.  
 Direct out-of-pocket payments remain unfair to poorer Zambians.  As such 
they should not form a major share of total health care financing.  
 
Introduction 
Globally, many countries are interested in ensuring an equitable health care 
financing system that gives their population access to health services when needed. 
Even at that, many African countries still do not have equitable health systems. In 
Zambia income inequality and poverty are high among the population. Despite the 
recent turnaround in the economy as shown by improvements in incomes, the 
majority of Zambians continue to live in poverty. 
Currently, Zambia is considering a major health systems reform toward a universal 
health system that will improve access and affordability of needed health services. 
Scientific evidence is needed in order to design such an equitable system. One area 
where evidence is needed in Zambia is an assessment of how health care financing 
affects income inequality.  An equitable situation occurs when a health financing 
system reduces inequality in income and households or individuals contribute to 
financing health care according to their ability to pay.  
Effect of paying for health care on income inequality 
Paying for health care can redistribute income in favour of the poor or rich. In Zambia 
direct taxes in form of personal income tax and corporate income tax contribute to an 
increase in income inequality. Unlike direct taxes, financing health care through 
indirect taxes in form of value added tax, fuel levy and excise taxes reduce income 




indirect taxes in Zambia were also found to increase income inequality; the increase 
in income inequality resulting from direct taxes offsets the decrease in income 
inequality arising from indirect taxes. 
Like general taxes, out of pocket payments were found to increase income 
inequality. Therefore, increased dependence on out of pocket payments in the 
overall health care financing in Zambia will not promote equity in health care 
financing as it is generally associated with adverse effects. Elsewhere, results show 
that dependence on out of pocket payments could cause hardship or push 
households into poverty or further into it, if they are already poor.   
Overall health care financing contributes to a reduction in income inequality in 
Zambia. Hence, health care financing system in Zambia favours the poor relative to 
the rich. However, this is not the case for some individual sources of health care 
financing like out of pocket payments. 
Policy recommendations  
Based on the findings of this study, policy makers may wish to consider the current 
overall structure of paying for health care in Zambia. As far as policy 
recommendations are concerned, the findings reported in this study while offering 
detailed analysis of the prevailing income inequality, there is need to reconsider 
some of the current individual sources of health care financing that contribute to an 
increase in income inequality in Zambia; namely, direct taxes and out of pocket 
payments.  
Given that financing health care through general taxes increases income inequality 
in Zambia, there can still be space to design them in such a way that they favour the 
poor relative to the rich. This can be done by examining individual components of 
direct taxes and indirect taxes that constitute general taxes and structuring the 
marginal tax rates in such a way as to discriminate favourable between different 
income groups. 
Since direct taxes increase income inequality in Zambia, there may be room to 
improve them. This can be done by increasing the number of income tax thresholds 
than what is currently in existence. With more categories, one can discriminate, more 




If other health care financing mechanisms are to be included in addition to general 
taxes, it is necessary that they do not contribute to an increase in income inequality. 
For Zambia, such potential policy measure is the introduction of a mandatory 
prepayment arrangement, especially, a social health insurance scheme that would 
provide financial risk protection and enable universal health coverage. 
For out of pocket payments, increased dependence on them in Zambia should be 
avoided as it increases income inequality. Generally, such payments are regarded 
as unfair.  
 
 
